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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The 21st century will witness rapid globalization with the world becoming increasingly
interdependent in terms of the ow of trade, direct investment, technology, and infor-
mation and knowledge. The worldwide technology diusion, economic liberalization, and
regulation relaxation will accelerate the international transactions of goods and services,
and deepen the strategic interactions among nations. The governments' policy decisions
on trade, investment and environment will no longer be set separately, but will be strate-
gically dependent on the reactions of other countries. This thesis aims to explore the
pervasive inuence of globalization and international economic interdependence on trade
policy implementation. Throughout the thesis, I would like to clarify the economic eects
of the governments' strategic decision-making on rms' actions, industrial prots, national
welfare, and world welfare when countries compete in a globally interdependent world.
Borderless economic activities make the rms' investment and production decisions
more complicated. The rms can not only move overseas, but also allow foreign sharehold-
ing of their stocks. Firms' diversied location choices and ownership structures also aect
the governments' strategic policy decisions. Using game theoretic approach, this thesis
reexamines strategic export subsidy policies from the following viewpoints:
 rm's relocation ability across the country.
 international cross shareholding of the rm's stocks.
 separation of ownership and management.
The above three topics concern the rm's external investment behavior and internal
structure. This thesis elucidates how the above dierent setups aect the governments'
subsidization incentives and what is the optimal policy in consideration of national and
world benets. Additionally, I discuss the importance of international coordination and try
to clarify what kind of coordinated policy and behavioral harmonization is necessary from
the viewpoint of world welfare maximization. This study is expected to be a path-breaking
research endeavor with regard to the institution-building for international coordination.
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1.2 Strategic Trade Policy Theory
The discussions throughout the thesis are based on the standard strategic trade policy
theory that originated in the 1980s. Let me rst briey review its development. The tra-
ditional trade theory focused on comparative advantage and productive factor endowment
with constant returns to scale and perfect competition. However, it did not eectively ex-
plain phenomena such as intra-industry trade among the developed countries and the trade
ows in the empirical investigations. The new trade theory stressing on increasing returns,
imperfect competition, and product dierentiation made remarkable progress toward the
end of the 1970s and explored new explanations for modern trade analyses (see Helpman
and Krugman (1985)).
With rapid growth in the rms globalization activities, the international community
became increasingly interdependent. Strategic interactions in oligopoly emerged as an
important element in analyzing the trade policies. At the beginning of the 1980s, the
development of modern industrial organization theory and game-theoretic models led to
the birth of strategic trade policy theory. Its simple and clear-cut approach showed new
implications in a wide array of policy considerations and provided a new perspective on
the understanding of market practices and policy formulations.
In denition, strategic trade policy refers to the policy that aects the outcomes of
strategic interactions between rms in an actual or potential international oligopoly (see
Spencer and Brander (2008)). Research in strategic trade policy was initiated by Brander
(1981), who analyzed intra-industry trade with identical commodities, and was stylized by
Brander and Spencer (1985), the well-known third-market model. Some other pioneering
researches include Brander and Spencer (1984a), Spencer and Brander (1983), Dixit (1984),
and Eaton and Grossman (1986).
In contrast to the traditional trade theory that advocates free trade, strategic trade pol-
icy theory provided new arguments for an interventionist trade policy. The representative
model, Brander and Spencer (1985) shown in the next chapter, revealed the government's
unilateral incentive to subsidize its domestic exports since strategic subsidization gives its
exporter a cost advantage and thereby shifts prots from the foreign rm toward the en-
hancement of national welfare in the oligopolistic market. Subsidy policy is never optimal
for national welfare maximization in the traditional trade theory that is based on perfect
competition. However, in the oligopolistic competition, it transfers the monopoly rents of
foreign rms to the domestic economy and thereby improves the domestic welfare. The
intervention to alter the strategic interaction between oligopolistic rms plays a great role
in trade policy determination.1
Strategic trade policy theory provided new insights into the real-world mercantilist
policies and complex empirical investigations. The original purpose of the study is not to
encourage the implementation of strategic trade policy, since it causes income distribution
and protectionist trade disputes within a more general analysis framework. However,
1Dixit (1987), Krugman (1988), Helpman and Krugman (1989), Brander (1995) and Wang (1995)
provided brilliant and systematic surveys on a broad range of strategic trade policy theory issues.
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studying strategic trade policy helps understand the strategic behaviors in the oligopolistic
market and extends the related research to multilateral trade agreements, foreign direct
investment, environmental regulation policies, etc. Although strategic trade policy analysis
has been applied into a wide range of contexts, some topics such as incomplete information,
dynamic games, and economic growth were not yet explored to the fullest.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 demonstrates the basic Brander and Spencer
(1985)'s model. The strategic rent-shifting eect is claried by using a reaction function
approach. I discuss the role of cost heterogeneity among the rms in governments subsidy
decisions. More detailed results are obtained under the special linear demand function in
preparation for the analyses in the proceeding chapters.
Chapter 3 deals with an international capital liberalization game in which exporting
countries choose either to open or not open the domestic market for capital inow. This
chapter claries that if the cost dierence is large enough, the less productive country is
indierent toward closing or opening for inward direct investment, but the more productive
country never has an incentive to open. International coordination to open markets is not
always necessary in the capital liberalization game since it may deteriorate the welfare of
the more productive country and worsen world welfare.
Chapter 4 develops a mixed international cross shareholding structure, which allows
the shares of the rms to be not only owned by domestic residents, but also by foreign
residents and foreign rms. Four additional eects are claried to weaken the governments
strategic subsidy incentives in the presence of international cross shareholding. An increase
in the weight of foreign rm's shareholding ratio facilitates collusion between the rms and
raises the government's strategic subsidy rate in the equilibrium. Moreover, the eects of
subsidy competition on national welfare and world welfare are also analyzed under two
special shareholding structures.
Chapter 5 studies the implication of the separation of ownership and management,
under which the owner of a rm delegates the production decision making to a manager
and designs an incentive contract for the manager. I elucidate the owner's subsidization
eect, which is hidden in the managerial delegation process. Strategic subsidy competition
between the governments strengthens both the owners' subsidization incentives and leads
to the over-subsidization of the rms. When the rms' delegation decisions are endoge-
nous, each rm has no incentive to delegate a manager under governments' intervention
commitments because unilateral delegation leads to Stackelberg follower payo.
Chapter 6 combines the analyses in Chapters 4-5 and examines the implication of
international separation of ownership and management when the shares of the exporting
rms are internationally owned and the owners of both rms make delegation decisions. It is
shown that cross-country shareholding of the rms weakens both countries' subsidization
incentives irrespective of owners' managerial decisions. However, managerial delegation
may strengthen or weaken governments' subsidization incentives and the result is dependent
3
on the cross shareholding structure. Chapter 6 also concludes the thesis as a whole.
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Chapter 2
Basic Model
In this chapter, I review the pioneer work of strategic subsidy theory by Brander and
Spencer (1985)(the BS model hereafter), which is the basic model throughout the thesis.
Brander and Spencer (1985) developed a third market model and studied the impact of ex-
port subsidy policy in the international duopoly market. They indicated that government's
strategic subsidy is a trade promotion policy since the domestic exporter gains a cost ad-
vantage and grabs the monopoly rents from the foreign rms to improve national welfare.
The welfare enhancement eect of strategic subsidization reversed the traditional advoca-
tion for laissez-faire and the optimal tari theory for welfare-improving trade restriction
policy.
To see why a subsidy policy works in the prot-shifting mechanism, let me rst demon-
strate the BS model in details.
2.1 Model Setup
Consider a world consisting of three countries, 1, 2 and 3. There is a rm residing in each
of countries 1 and 2, producing a homogeneous product, and exporting to country 3, which
does not produce but only consume the product in question.
Let xi(i = 1; 2) denote the output produced by rm i and ci its marginal cost of produc-
tion. Assume ci is exogenously constant and the markets of the countries are segmented.
Denote p as the market price in country 3, an importing country, X(= x1 + x2) the total
consumption, and p = P (X) its inverse demand function.
International trade is modelled as a two-stage game involving governments and rms as
follows. In the rst stage, each government determines its country-specic export subsidy
si(i = 1; 2) simultaneously. In the second stage, after observing the subsidy rates (s1; s2),
the rms engage in quantity competition in the third market.
Given the subsidy rate si, the prot earned by rm i is expressed by
i(x; si) = fP (x1 + x2)  ci + sigxi (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i); (2-1)
where x = (x1; x2) denotes the output prole.
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For the simplicity of explanation, I Dene:
i
def
=
xi
X
; (X)
def
=   P
XP 0(X)
; E(X)
def
=  XP
00
(X)
P 0(X)
;
where i denotes rm i's market share, (X) the price elasticity of demand and E(X) the
elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve. The market clearing condition requires
1 + 2 = 1.
Assumption 2.1. Given the subsidy rates (s1; s2) set by countries 1 and 2, the following
conditions are all satised:
(A2.1.1) P (X) is strictly decreasing, continuously dierentiable, and P (0) > ci   si >
P (+1) for i = 1; 2, where P (0) = limX#+0 P (X) and P (+1) = limX"+1 P (X).
(A2.1.2) Each rm's prot function i(x; si) is strictly concave in its own output xi, i.e.,
@2i(x; si)
@x2i
= P 0(X)(2  iE(X)) < 0:
(A2.1.3) ci   si < pmi = P (xmi (si)) where xmi (si) = argxi i(xi; 0; si).
(A2.1.1) implies that each rm, when it is a monopolist in the third country mar-
ket, has an incentive to produce a strictly positive output. (A2.1.2) implies that the
prot-maximizing output of each rm given the rival's, if it ever proves to be positive, is
characterized by the rst-order condition (the FOC hereafter). And lastly (A2.1.3) ensures
that neither rm can become a monopolist when the rival has an incentive to enter the
market given the monopoly output and price. Note that Assumption 2.1 is sucient to
assure the existence of a Cournot-duopoly equilibrium.
Solving from the second stage, rm i's reaction function, denoted by ri(xj; si) is a
solution to the FOC for maximizing (2-1) with respect to its own output as below.
0 =
@i(ri(xj; si); xj; si)
@xi
= P
 
ri(xj; si) + xj
  ci + si + ri(xj; si)P 0  ri(xj; si) + xj ;
(2-2)
where the second-order condition (the SOC hereafter) is ensured by (A2.1.2).
For the following analyses, I assume Hahn's stability condition is satised.
Assumption 2.2. 　 Each rm's output is mutually a strategic substitute to the other's,
i.e., P 0(X) + xiP
00
(X) < 0, or alternatively, 1  iE(X) > 0 (i = 1; 2).
Strategic substitution holds for (i)nonconvex inverse demand function (E(X)  0) or
(ii)a suciently small market share in convex demand function. On the other hand, if
1  iE(X) < 0, each rm's output is a strategic complement to the other's.1
1The discussion for strategic substitution and strategic complementary was shown in Bulow, Geanako-
plos, and Klemperer (1985).
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In view of Assumption A2.1.2 and A2.2, the following properties of the reaction function
are shown below by using the implicit function theorem in (2-2).
rix(xj; si)
def
=
@ri(xj; si)
@xj
=  1  iE(X)
2  iE(X) < 0; (2-3)
ris(x

j ; si)
def
=
@ri(xj; si)
@si
=   1
P 0(X)(2  iE(X)) > 0: (2-4)
(2-3) implies that each rm's reaction curve is downward sloping. (2-4) represents that
an increase in the unit subsidy rate raises the optimal response output. The associated
reaction curve of rm i is shown by riri0 in Figure 2.1. The intersection labeledN represents
the equilibrium output.
Lemma 2.1. The absolute value of the slope of the reaction function is strictly smaller
than unity, i.e., jrix(xj; si)j < 1 under strategic substitution.2
The above Lemma ensures that an equilibrium, if it ever exists, should be unique and
globally stable under the standard Cournot output adjustment process.
Denote xi (s) as rm i's equilibrium output where s = (s1; s2) represents the subsidy
prole. It should satisfy:
xi (s) = r
i
 
xj(s); si

for i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i: (2-5)
Accordingly, X(s) def= x1(s) + x

2(s) denotes the equilibrium total output, P
(s) def=
P (X(s)) the associated equilibrium price, and i (s)
def
= i
 
xi (s); x

j(s); si

the equilibrium
prot of rm i.
2By using (2-3), rix(xj ; si) + 1 =
1
2 iE(X) > 0 is satised.
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2.2 Standard Strategic Export Subsidy Policies
BS model claried that each exporting country has a positive incentive to subsidize its
own exports. To ascertain this result, I rst undertake comparative statics on the subsidy-
ridden duopoly equilibrium with respect to a change in the export subsidy rate set by
either exporting country. Dierentiation of (2-5) with respect to si yields:

1  rix(xj ; si)
 rjx(xi ; sj) 1

@xi (s)=@si
@xj(s)=@si

=

ris(x

j ; si)
0

: (2-6)
Using (2-3),
B
def
= 1  rix(xi ; si)rjx(xj ; sj) =
3  E
(2  iE)(2  jE) > 0; (2-7)
where the denominator is positive in view of the concavity of prot function by Assumption
A2.1.2, and the numerator is also positive since the familiar stability condition holds.3
Then (2-6) yields:
@xi (s)
@si
=
ris(x

j(s); si)
B
=   2  jE(X)
P 0(X)(3  E(X)) > 0; (2-8)
@xj(s)
@si
= rjx(x

i (s); sj)
@xi (s)
@si
=
1  jE(X)
P 0(X)(3  E(X)) < 0; (2-9)
where use was made of (2-3), (2-4) and (2-7). An increase in si shifts rm i's reaction
curve outward and the equilibrium point changes to N s. Subsidization lowers the domestic
marginal cost, so in the equilibrium rm i's output increases and rm j's output decreases
shown in Fig. 2.1.
The total output and the market price change as follows.
@X(s)
@si
=
 
1 + rjx(x

i ; sj)
 @xi (s)
@si
=
 1
P 0(X)(3  E(X)) > 0;
@P (s)
@si
= P 0(X(s))
@X(s)
@si
=
 1
3  E(X) < 0:
The equilibrium prot of each rm should change as expressed by:
@i (s)
@si
= xiP
0(X)
@xj(s)
@si
+ xi > 0; (2-10)
@j (s)
@si
= xjP
0(X)
@xi (s)
@si
< 0; (2-11)
where use was made of (2-2) (2-8) and (2-9).
3See Dixit (1986).
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In Fig. 2.1, an increase in s1 shifts the equilibrium point from N to N
s. Country 1's
unilateral export subsidization allows the domestic rm to attain a higher production level
as a Stackelberg leader, forcing the foreign rm to respond as a follower. In equilibrium,
rm 1's prot (represented by the isoprot curve) increases from 1 to 1s, while rm 2's
prot decreases from 2 to 
s
2. Fig. 2.1 shows the standard prot shifting eect of export
subsidization in the BS model.
s1 "
x1
x2
1
1s
r1
r10
r1s
r1s0
r2
r20
2
2s
N
N s
Fig. 2.1: Rent Shifting Eect of Export Subsidization
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2.3 Welfare Eect of Export Subsidies
The government of each exporting country aims to maximize the total surplus consisting
of the domestic rm's private prot minus the subsidy expenses.
Wi(s) = 

i (s)  sixi (s) (i = 1; 2):
The social welfare function is equivalent to the subsidy-exclusive prot function of the
domestic rm, since the increased subsidy expenses are canceled by the cost reduction of
the rm. Export subsidy is regarded as an income redistribution from taxpayers to rm's
shareholders. In practice, public nance for subsidy expenses incurs distortion costs on the
economy. Here I rule out the domestic distortions on subsidy transfer, assuming that the
opportunity cost of a dollar of public funds equals unit.4
The concavity of the welfare function is assumed as below.
Assumption 2.3. The welfare function of each exporting country is strictly concave in
the own export subsidy rate.
@2Wi(s)
@s2i
< 0:
The governments of both exporting countries independently decide the own export sub-
sidy rates by foreseeing their resulting eects on the market performance. Each country's
reaction function is now given by:
Ri(sj) :
def
= argmax
si
Wi(s):
The strategic interdependence between the two exporting countries' governments is
governed by the shape of each reaction curve. Its slope is given by:
Ris(sj) :=
@Ri(sj)
@sj
=  @
2Wi(R
i(sj); sj)=@sj@si
@2Wi(Ri(sj); sj)=@s2i
;
for i; j = 1; 2(j 6= i). The signum of the slope is generally indeterminate, but insofar as the
demand function is linear, one can show that each country's export subsidy is a strategic
substitute to the other's, i.e. @
2Wi(s)
@sj@si
< 0.
By virtue of the FOC for welfare maximization by each exporting country's government,
the following equation holds at equilibrium.
0 =
@Wi(s)
@si
= xiP
0(X)
@xj
@si
  si@x

i
@si
(2-12)
4Neary (1994) introduced a distortion cost parameter in the welfare function as Wi = i  sixi, where
  1 represents the subsidy transfer distortion. The equilibrium subsidy is positive only when 1   < 43 .
Otherwise, if  > 43 , taxing the exports is optimal.
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Denote the equilibrium subsidy rate as sBi and the superscript B denotes the equilibrium
values in the BS model.
sBi = x

iP
0(X)rjx =  xiP 0(X)
1  jE(X)
2  jE(X) > 0; (2-13)
where use was made of (2-8) and (2-9). Insofar as the analyses are conned in Assumption
2.2, each exporting country has a positive incentive to subsidize the domestic rm.5 Due
to the rent shifting eect, domestic rm's prot gain outweighs the subsidy expenses, so
export subsidy improves the national welfare at the end. Brander-Spencer subsidy result
is summarized into the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.1 (Brander and Spencer (1985)). At the non-cooperative export subsidy
game equilibrium, each exporting country's government sets a strictly positive rate of export
subsidy at the Nash equilibrium, i.e., sBi > 0(i = 1; 2) when each rm's export is a strategic
substitute to the other's in the Cournot competition.
When each country maximizes its own welfare at si = R
i(sj), either country's marginal
welfare with respect to its rival country's export subsidy rate can be evaluated as below.
Dierentiating Wj(s) with respect to si yields
@Wj(s)
@si
= xjP
0(X)
@xi
@si
  sj
@xj
@si
= xjP
0(X)
@xi
@si
  xjP 0(X)rix
@xj
@si
= BxjP
0(X)
@xi
@si
< 0; (2-14)
where use was made of (2-8), (2-9), and (2-13).
Lemma 2.2. At the non-cooperative export subsidy game equilibrium, an increase in the
subsidy rate by either country worsens the other exporting country's welfare,i.e.,
@Wj(s)
@si
< 0
for i; j = 1; 2(j 6= i).
The third country is a consuming country without production. Its welfare is expressed
by the domestic consumption surplus as follows.
W3(s) =
Z X(s)
0
P (z)dz   P (X(s))X(s):
An increase in either country's subsidy rate expands the total exports to the third
country and thereby improves its terms of trade.
@W3(s)
@si
=  X(s)P 0(X)@X
(s)
@si
> 0: (2-15)
5Collie and de Meza (1986) and Bandyopadhyay (1997) discussed that the positive subsidization incen-
tive is largely dependent on the elasticities of demand.
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The third country is always beneted from export subsidization policy since subsidization
pushes the market price toward the competitive level.
World welfare is given by the sum of three countries' welfare.
WT (s) =
3X
i=1
Wi(s) =
Z X(s)
0
P (z)dz   c1x1(s)  c2x2(s): (2-16)
Dierentiating with si yields
@WT (s)
@si
= (P   ci)@x

i (s)
@si
+ (P   cj)
@xj
@si
:
When ci is large enough close to P , the rst term in the above equation can be neglected.
Since the second term is negative, subsidizing rm i, the inecient rm lowers the total
production eciency and worsens world welfare. Otherwise, when cj is large enough, world
welfare improves.
Furthermore, by using (2-14) and (2-15), the above equation can be rewritten as below.
@WT (s)
@si
=
@Wj(s)
@si
+
@W3(s)
@si
= BxjP
0(X)
@xi
@si
+XP 0(X)
@X
@si
= BxjP
0(X)
@xi
@si
  (1 +Rjx)XP 0(X)
@xi
@si
:
Since
@xi (s)
@si
> 0 in (2-8), simple calculation yields
@WT (s)
@si
> 0 () j < 1 R
j
x
B
;
which follows (2-9) and the market share denition of i.
In the case of linear demand function discussed in Section 2.5, it follows that subsidizing
rm i improves world welfare if and only if j <
2
3
, or alternatively, i >
1
3
, as shown in
Lahiri and Ono (1988). Put dierently, subsidizing a relatively inecient rm, whose
market share is lower that 1
3
deterioates world welfare.
When the cost conditions are symmetric that c1 = c2 = c, (2-16) shows that an increase
in either country's subsidy rate unambiguously improves world welfare.
@WT (s)
@si
= (P   c)@X

@si
> 0:
The above equation shows the allocation eect only. An increase in the subsidy rate
raises the total output and reduces the welfare loss in the oligopolistic industry due to
the wedge between the market price and the marginal cost. Thus, the world allocation
eciency is improved as a whole.
Proposition 2.2. Under symmetric cost function, subsidizing the exports improves world
welfare in a third-market model.
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2.4 Cost Asymmetry and Subsidization Incentives
When the exporting rms exhibit cost heterogeneity, de Meza (1986) examined how the
subsidization incentives relate with the cost asymmetry. The subsidy dierential can be
obtained from (2-13).
sBi   sBj
= xiP
0(X)rjx   xjP 0(X)rix
=  xiP 0(X)1  jE(X)
2  jE(X) + xjP
0(X)
1  iE(X)
2  iE(X)
=
 xiP 0(X)(1  jE(X))(2  iE(X)) + xjP 0(X)(1  iE(X))(2  jE(X))
(2  jE(X))(2  iE(X))
=
 (xi   xj)P 0(X)(1  iE(X))(1  jE(X))  xiP 0(X)(1  jE(X)) + xjP 0(X)(1  iE(X))
(2  jE(X))(2  iE(X))
=
 (xi   xj)P 0(X) [(1  iE(X))(1  jE(X)) + 1]
(2  jE(X))(2  iE(X)) ;
which follows (2-3). Note that
xiP
0(X)(1  jE(X)) = xjP 0(X)(1  iE(X))
is satised. In view of (2-2), it yields
xi   xj =
(ci   cj)  (sBi   sBj )
P 0(X)
:
Substitution of the above equation into sBi   sBj yields
sBi   sBj =  (ci   cj)
(1  iE(X))(1  jE(X)) + 1
2  E(X) : (2-17)
In view of Assumption 2.2 that 1 kE > 0(k = i; j), the subsidy dierential is inversely
related to the cost dierential.
sBi   sBj /  (ci   cj);
which shows that the more ecient the domestic rm, the greater the subsidy dierential.
The result is summarized into the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.3. (de Meza (1986)) The low-cost country has the incentive to oer the
higher subsidies when each rm's export is a strategic substitute of the other's.
In view of (2-2), given the rival's output, the low-cost rm benets both from the
productive advantage and the larger market shares in the Cournot competition. Subsidizing
the ecient rm cuts the production cost further down and thereby makes the rm secure
larger market shares so as to improve national welfare. Hence, the country with the low-
cost rm results in a greater equilibrium subsidy rate than the rival country. The above
subsidy dierential result shown in de Meza (1986) is important in explaining the economic
intuition in the proceeding chapters.
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2.5 Linear Demand Case
The following linear inverse demand function is assumed so as to derive explicit results
throughout the ongoing analyses.
p = P (X) = a X;
where a is a positive constant and a > ci(i = 1; 2).
Each rm non-cooperatively chooses its output so as to maximize its prot given by
i(x; si) = (a  xi   xj   ci + si)xi: (2-18)
Each rm's reaction function for prot maximization is given by6
riB(xj; si) := argmax
xi
i(x; si) =
1
2
(a  ci + si   xj): (2-19)
Clearly, each rm's optimal response output is a strategic substitute to the rival's as
rix =  12 < 0 and the condition for local stability is obviously satised.7
Solving for the equilibrium output yields
xBi (s) =
i + 2si   sj
3
; (2-20)
where i := a  2ci + cj > 0(i; j = 1; 2 : j 6= i) > 0 for positive quantities under duopoly.
Accordingly, the equilibrium total output can by expressed as below.
XB(s) =
1
3
 
2a 
X
i=1;2
(ci   si)
!
= X^
 X
i=1;2
(ci   si)
!
:
Notice that the equilibrium total output depends only on the sum of the subsidy-inclusive
unit costs over the industry. 8
6The SOC for each rm's prot maximization is satised, i.e.,
@2i(x; si)
@x2i
=  2 < 0:
7The following condition ensures local stability of the second-stage Nash equilibrium under the adjust-
ment process described by
_xi = i

ri (xj ; si)  xi
	
:
8In fact, summation of the FOCs for prot maximization over the rms give rise to (See Varian (1992))
0 = 2P (X) +XP 0(X) 
X
i=1;2
(ci   si) =) X = X^
0@X
i=1;2
(ci   si)
1A :
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The comparative statics results yield
@xBi (s)
@si
=
2
3
> 0 ;
@xBj (s)
@si
=  1
3
< 0: (2-21)
Substituing (2-5) into (2-18) yields each rm's equilibrium prot.
Bi (s) = 
i(xBi (s); x
B
j (s); si) =
(i + 2si   sj)2
9
:
Exporting country's welfare is expressed as below.
Wi(s) := 
B
i (s)  sixBi (s) =
(i + 2si   sj)(i   si   sj)
9
: (2-22)
Each country sets its subsidy rate to maximize the net surplus in (2-22). The reaction
function in the rst-stage is derived as9
RiB(sj) := argmax
si
Wi(s) =
1
4
(i   sj): (2-23)
The equilibrium subsidy rate of country i, sBi which is given by
sBi =
4i   j
15
: (2-24)
The associated equilibrium output and prot of each rm is expressed by
x^Bi = x
B
i (s
B) =
2(4i   j)
15
; (2-25)
^Bi = 
B
i (s
B) =
 
xBi (s
B)
2
=

2(4i   j)
15
2
:
The associated equilibrium welfare of each exporting country is expressed by
cWBi =Wi(sB) = 24i   j15
2
: (2-26)
When the two exporting governments engage in subsidy competition, both fall into
a prisoners' dilemma with lower welfare than laissez faire, i.e., Wi(s
B) < Wi(0) under
symmetric cost conditions. World welfare, however, rises since the gain to consumers in
the importing country more than osets the loss in welfare to the exporting countries.
9The SOC for each country's welfare maximization is satised, i.e.,
@2Wi(s)
@s2i
=  4
9
< 0:
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2.6 Discussion
The main contribution in the BS model lies in that export subsidization may enhance the
exporting country's welfare in imperfectly competitive market in the absence of interdepen-
dence with the other sectors in the economy. The model is characterized by the assumption
that all the outputs are sold in a third country, which does not produce but only consume
the product in question. The national welfare is simply constituted by the sum of producer
surplus and government surplus, or alternatively, the home rm's subsidy-exclusive prot.
The simplied setup removes the consideration for the consumption eects of strategic
subsidization. When moving the consuming market from the third country to the export-
ing country, it is straightforward to obtain that the exporting country's government has
more incentives to subsidize the domestic products due to the dual positive eects, i.e., the
prot shifting eect and terms-of-trade improvement eect. However, the optimal policy
for the foreign imports is not evident since taxation increases the tax revenue and causes
consumer surplus loss as well. Brander and Spencer (1984a,b) showed whether the optimal
policy is import tax or import subsidy is dependent on the elasticity of the slope of the
inverse demand function, i.e., the value of E(X).
The third market and home market analyses can be combined into the reciprocal trade
model, the basic structure of which is built by Brander (1981) and elaborated by Brander
and Krugman (1983). There are two countries, and the markets of these two countries
are segmented. The outputs of each rm not only supply to the domestic market, but
also export to the foreign market. Each rm makes strategic production decisions toward
domestic and foreign markets separately. Each government is allowed to subsidize the
domestic sales and domestic exports and levy tax on the foreign imports. Then the third-
market and home-market analyses are integrated into one model, as shown in Dixit (1984).
The reciprocal trade model is useful in synthesizing varied trade policies; however, it lacks
clarity due to the complicated structure in analysis. Third market model is somewhat
simple, but is widely applied when considering industrial prots and consumer surplus
separately.
Relaxing the special conditions in the BS model, a number of papers examined how
dierent frameworks lead to alternative implications for the modied results. Markusen
and Venables (1988) indicated that the rent shifting eects of export subsidies become
weak when Cournot markets are integrated. Under the same assumption of integrated
markets, Horstman and Markusen (1986) showed that welfare enhancing export subsidies
may bring inecient entry in the presence of decreasing average cost. In the framework
of a perfectly competitive third-market, Bagwell and Staiger (2001) discussed that the
optimal export policy is positive subsidy if the politically motivated governments weigh
heavily on the industrial prots . The result in the BS model is also challenged by Eaton
and Grossman (1986), who indicated that the so-called rent extraction eects of export
subsidization hinges on the market structure of quantity competition a la Cournot with zero
conjectural variations. The optimal export subsidy may become negative under Bertrand
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competition.10 Relaxing the assumption of entry restrictions, Dixit and Grossman (1986)
pointed out that due to the lack of information for the government, free trade is the best
policy when there are more than two oligopolistic export industries. However, insofar as we
are conned into the original BS model framework and the long-run view of competition
according to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), one cannot neglect the exporting country's
incentive to subsidize its own domestic rms.
The succeeding chapters explore the eects of governments' strategic subsidy policies
in view of the rms' location choice, the international cross shareholding structure and the
separation of ownership and management in the framework of the BS model.
10See Appendix 2.A.
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Appendix
2.A Product Dierentiation and Conjectural Varia-
tions
Eaton and Grossman (1986) represented a third-market model incorporating a general
conjectural variations model when products are dierentiated. They indicated that the
so-called rent extraction eects of export subsidization hinges on the market structure of
quantity competition a la Cournot with zero conjectural variations. The optimal export
subsidy may become negative when rms compete in a Bertrand fashion, since taxation
raises the output price and leads to higher before-export-tax prot. Bilateral intervention
results in a win-win situation, improving both countries' welfare. Maggi (1996) incor-
porated the Bertrand and Cournot outcome in a capacity-price competition model and
showed that a unilateral single-rate small capacity subsidy is a welfare-improving policy
as in Brander and Spencer (1985). The governments have incentives to grant capacity
subsidies regardless of the mode of competition.
Assume that each rm produces a substitute goods to each other. The inverse demand
function is Pi(x)(i = 1; 2) satisfying
@Pi(x)
@xi
< 0 and @Pi(x)
@xj
< 0. The prot function of rm
i is given by
i(x; si) = (Pi(x)  ci + si)xi:
Conjecture Variation: Denote i =
dxj
dxi
as rm i's conjectural variation, which rep-
resents rm i's conjecture about the rival rm's output change in response to its own
output.
The FOC for prot maximization yields
0 =
@i
@xi
+ i
@i
@xj
= Pi(x)  ci + si + xi

@Pi(x)
@xi
+ i
@Pi(x)
@xj

: (2.A-1)
Each rm maximizes its prot on the conjecture of the rival rm's output change. Using
i can capture dierent kinds of equilibria in a unied model.
 Competitive conjecture (own price P i unchanged): i =   @Pi(x)=@xi
@Pi(x)=@xj
.
 Cournot conjecture (prices adjusted ): i = 0.
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 Bertrand conjecture (rival rm's price P j unchanged): i =   @Pj(x)=@xi@Pj(x)=@xj :11
 Stackelberg Leader: i = rjx (in Eq. (2-3)).
In view of (2.A-1) and (2-9), welfare maximization yields
0 =
@Wi(s)
@si
=  xii@Pi(:)
@xj
@xi
@si
+ xi
@Pi(:)
@xj
@xj
@si
  si@x

i
@si
=

 xii@Pi(:)
@xj
+ xir
j
x
@Pi(:)
@xj
  si

@xi
@si
;
where rjx represents the slope of rm j's reaction function, i.e., rm j's actual output
changes in response. The optimal subsidy is shown as below.
sVi =  xi(i   rjx)
@Pi(:)
@xj
: (2.A-2)
Since @Pi(:)
@xj
< 0, it follows that
i T rjx () si T 0:
BS model claried that government subsidization makes the own rm achieve the Stack-
elberg leader position in the Cournot competition. If the rm's conjecture about rival's
output coincides with the Stackelberg result, government intervention can not increase
the domestic prot further more, so free trade is optimal. This is the so-called consis-
tent conjecture. If the rm's conjecture about rival's output is larger (or smaller) than
the Stackelberg result, its own output under prot maximization is less (or greater) than
Stackelberg equilibrium, so the government should subsidize (or taxes) the rm to attain
the point.
Cournot Solution: Under Cournot conjecture when i = 0, the optimal subsidy is
sVi = xir
j
x
@Pi(:)
@xj
:
sVi is negatively proportional to r
j
x, which is dened in (2-3). Hence, if the rm's output
is a strategic substitute to the rival's, i.e., rkx < 0(k = i; j), the government has a positive
incentive to subsidize the exports.
11Under homogeneous product competition that P ii = P
i
j , competitive and Bertrand conjecture take on
the value  1, which yields p = ci.
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Bertrand Solution: The demand function of rm i 's output is denoted as xi(p), where
p = (p1; p2) is the price prole and
@xi(p)
@pi
<  @xi(p)
@pj
< 0.12
Each rm's prot function is given by
i(p; si) = (pi   ci + si)xi(p):
FOC for prot maximization yields
0 =
@i(p; si)
@pi
= xi + (pi   ci + si)@xi(p)
@pi
: (2.A-3)
Bertrand conjecture yields
i =  @Pj(x)=@xi
@Pj(x)=@xj
=
@xj(p)=@pi
@xi(p)=@pi
;
where each rm conjectures that its rival remains its price unchanged in response to any
changes in its own price change. Putting the above i into (2.A-1) leads to the FOC
of (2.A-3) in the Bertrand competition. The equilibrium price of each rm's product is
denoted as pi (s).
The actual respond rjx can be shown in the following form
rjx =
@xj(:)
@pi
@pi (:)
@si
+
@xj(:)
@pj
@pj (:)
@si
@xi(:)
@pi
@pi (:)
@si
+ @xi(:)
@pj
@pj (:)
@si
=
@xj(:)
@pi
+
@xj(:)
@pj
 jp
@xi(:)
@pi
+ @xi(:)
@pj
 jp
;
where  jp =  @
2i(:)=@pi@pj
@2i(:)=@p2i
represents the slope of rm j's reaction curve under Bertrand
competition and the stability condition requires j ji j < 1.
Thus, to examine government's optimal policy, I obtain
i   rjx =

@xj(:)
@pi
@xi(:)
@pj
  @xi(:)
@pi
@xj(:)
@pj

 jp
@xi(:)
@pi

@xi(:)
@pi
+ @xi(:)
@pj
 jp
 /   jp:
In view of (2.A-2), sVi < 0 if
@2j(:)
@pi@pj
> 0. That is, if each rm's product price is a strategic
complementary to the rival's, the optimal policy is export tax.
@2j(:)
@pi@pj
> 0 is satised in
the most substitute goods cases.
In summarization, rms' competition mode aects the governments' optimal interven-
tion policies greatly. Quantity competition makes the optimal policy tend to be a subsidy
(Brander and Spencer (1985)), while price competition tend to be a tax (Eaton and Gross-
man (1986)).
12Although Bertrand solution can be shown explicitly by using a direct reaction function approach, I
follow Eaton and Grossman (1986) to check the relationship between the conjecture response and actual
response.
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Chapter 3
Capital Liberalization of Exporting
Countries
3.1 Introduction
Cross-border capital ows to emerging markets have accelerated since the early 1990s. In
emerging Asia, gross capital ows - both inow and outow, amounted to about US$830
in 2007. In sub-Saharan African countries, these have shown a dramatic vefold increase
from 2001 to 2007. Those of emerging Europe also shows a rising trend and having gained
an unprecedented share of GDP in recent history.1
Foreign direct investment (FDI) constitutes a major component of capital inows. After
the Mexican and Asian crises in the late 1990s, a number of countries imposed measures
to restrict or discourage short-term capital inows, but long-term inows, that is, FDI,
still grow steadily in most countries. Empirical papers asserted that free capital ows
for FDI investment facilitate substantial economic growth and development in emerging
market countries. However, in reality, FDI in some special industries may be ruled out by
legislation (e.g., aircraft and steel), mandatory approvals (e.g., pharmaceutical) and admin-
istrative procedures (e.g., automobile). This chapter intends to clarify the governments'
capital liberalization incentives for FDI investment with subsidy competition between two
competing exporting countries.
Given that capital liberalization is exogenous, recent voluminous works on FDI have
studied rms' strategic location choices. Without government intervention, cost dierence
plays an important role in rms' location choices between domestic and foreign production.
Horstman and Markusen (1992) discussed how entry-mode (export or FDI) cost dierence
between trade cost and xed cost aects the endogenized market structure. Ishikawa and
Komoriya (2009a) additionally focused on location-specic cost dierence2 and showed the
existence of multiple equilibria.
1See Regional Economic Outlook, IMF.
2Ishikawa and Komoriya (2009a) assumed that for each rm, foreign production cost is always lower
than domestic production cost.
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However, a number of FDI studies on location choice tackle government intervention,3
especially tax (subsidy) competition between two asymmetric hosting countries to attract
a foreign-owned multinational enterprise. Haaparanta (1996) focused on the wage dier-
ence across countries and discussed the subsidy eects on the allocation of investment
level. Hauer and Wooton (1999) and Barros and Cabral (2000) considered the eect of
the dierence in country size and claried that the larger country is at an advantage in
attracting the rm due to agglomeration eects. The former considered the availability
of multiple policy instruments (combined with import tari or consumption tax). The
latter considered domestic employment gains from FDI and showed that the small country
may win the competition when the employment gain is large enough. It was shown that
subsidy competition always improves the small country's welfare and worsens the large
country's welfare independent of the rm's location. On the basis of the above two papers,
Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) considered country size as well as the role of market structure.
With a domestic rm located in the large country, the prot-shifting eect of FDI makes
the small country more attractive. Fumagalli (2003) discussed the technology spillover ef-
fect through attracting FDI. The country with the less ecient rm always gains through
subsidy competition since subsidy distortion is dominated by consumer gain and domestic
prot gain. Hao and Lahiri (2009) examined the role of the technology level and number
of rms in the host countries. Their results claried that tax competition has no eect
on a multinational rm's location choice if trade between the rms in the host countries
is possible. Besides the tax (subsidy) bidding policy, Ra (2004) considered hosting coun-
tries' incentives to form an FTA or CU; Albornoz and Corcos (2007) compared the eects
of the policies of subsidy harmonization (zero subsidy) and coordination (maximizing joint
welfare) on rm's location choice; and Davies, Egger, and Egger (2007) discussed dierent
taxation regimes for location advantage with regard to headquarters.
The above literatures investigated the competition policies to attract MNEs to serve
the hosting countries' markets. With the exception of Janeba (1998), no study separated
the host countries from domestic consumption, that is, attracting MNEs between two
export-oriented host countries. Without domestic consumption, the study returns to the
original implication of tax competition. Janeba (1998) took into account a third market
model, in which two exporting rms can locate in either exporting country, but not a third
country, the consuming country. So, the location choice is simply determined by the tax
(subsidy) rates. With rms' free mobility, each exporting country is restrained from tax
(subsidy) competition because high rates of subsidies benet the foreign rms relocating to
their home country, leading to the outow of rent. Meanwhile, taxation restrains the rent
outow but induces both rms to go abroad, leading to a loss of tax revenue. Janeba (1998)
showed that the resulting equilibrium entails free trade, the well-known race-to-the-bottom
result, and that mutual capital liberalization dominates mutual capital restriction.
Most studies focused on the competition policy for attracting a single MNE, and so the
implications of the production technology asymmetry among the investment rms has been
3See Dembour (2008) for a detailed survey on competition policies and rms' location choices.
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paid little attention.4 In the framework of the Brander and Spencer (1985) (the BS model)
without rms' mobility, de Meza (1986) and Neary (1994) showed that cost asymmetry
across two exporting rms plays an important role in subsidy competition policies. Since
each rm's equilibrium output is dependent on the cost function, the subsidized low-cost
rm can capture a larger market share and extract more rent in the duopolistic market.
The country with relatively ecient rm results in higher equilibrium subsidy rates, ceteris
paribus.5 Given a number of cost heterogenous rms in each exporting country, Long and
Soubeyran (2001) showed that export tax may be optimal dependent on the Herndahl
index and demand function. With rms' relocation ability, Janeba (1998) showed that
capital liberalization nullies the eect of cost asymmetry. Both the low-cost and high-cost
countries' subsidization incentives are dampened and laissez faire equilibrium is realized.
This chapter studies two rms' FDI location choices between two export-oriented coun-
tries as in Janeba (1998) and focuses on the cost asymmetry between two rms. Since no
study has discussed the individual government's incentive of capital liberalization for FDI
investment, this chapter endogenizes governments' decisions on capital liberalization in the
rst stage. When the capitalization policy is not exogenously given, the cost-asymmetry
eect is restored to play a crucial role in the exporting countries' tax (subsidy) competition
policies.
If both exporting countries can use two policy instruments, that is, capital liberalization
and subsidization, the governments should take into account the strategic eect as well as
the rent-shifting eect. When liberalizing capital to let the foreign rm move in, the
country intends to increase the tax revenues from the foreign rm. However, they can
not impose a high tax since it not only fails to attract the foreign rm, but also may
lose the tax revenue from the domestic rm. Subsidization can attract the foreign rm
eectively, but causes the subsidy payment ew out to the foreign country. Thus, there is
no optimal trade intervention under mutual capital liberalization. However, when capital
liberalization decisions are endogenized, the high-subsidization country has an incentive
to restrict capital, but the low-subsidization one does not have such incentives. The key
variable lies in the cost asymmetry, which determines the optimal subsidy rate. The
research is interesting in that it considers the strategic relationship between the two policy
instruments.
The analysis in this chapter is based on Kiyono and Wei (2007, 2008),6 which incorpo-
rated the analyses in Janeba (1998)'s analysis into an international capital liberalization
model and claried how the cost dierence aects the exporting countries' capital liberal-
ization incentives. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a
four-stage capital liberalization model in which the governments of the exporting countries
decide on their capital liberalization at the rst stage. Section 3 briey reviews the stan-
dard strategic subsidization incentives of the BS model analyzed in the previous chapter
4One exception is Katayama, Lahiri, and Tomiura (2005), who examined two host countries competing
for a number of cost heterogeneous rms and claried the dispersion among the marginal costs of the rms
that aects the attractiveness of a country.
5See details in Section 2.4.
6The earlier version is Kiyono and Wei (2002).
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as the rst subgame. In section 4, the eects of relocatability of the rms following Janeba
(1998) are discussed as the second subgame. Section 5 examines the subgames in which
one exporting country liberalizes capital and classies the subgame equilibria into three
types. Section 6 explores the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of our capital liberalization
game and the implications of non cooperative decisions of the exporting countries on the
world welfare. Lastly, in section 7, the conclusions to this chapter are summarized.
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3.2 Model Setup
The model is constructed under the framework of the BS model. The game, which is called
the capital liberalization game, incorporates the following four stages of decision.
1st stage The governments of both exporting countries decide simultaneously on whether
to close or open the domestic market for capital inow from abroad.
2nd stage After observing the decisions on capital liberalization, the governments of both
exporting countries simultaneously decide on the production (=export) subsidy rate.7
3rd stage If at least one country is ready to liberalize capital, the rms in the other
countries decide simultaneously where to locate their production plants, either in
country 1 or 2. If both countries have decided to refuse capital inow, there follows
the next stage.
4th stage After observing the locations of production plants, both rms simultaneously
decide on how much to produce and export to country 3.
Each government has two policy instruments: (i) the capital liberalization policy i(i =
1; 2) 2 fC;Og where C represents the policy of closing the domestic market against capital
inow from abroad and O the policy of opening the market, and (ii) the production sub-
sidization policy si(i = 1; 2). In view of the rst-stage decisions for i, the present game
can be divided into four subgames as shown in Table 3.1. A subgame associated with
capital liberalization policy prole (1; 2) (2 fC;Og  fC;Og) is called subgame 12.
The payo W 12i (i = 1; 2) in the table denotes the equilibrium welfare of country i for
subgame 12. In terms of this terminology, subgame CC is the BS model in which both
countries close their markets to restrain capital mobility, while subgame OO is the one an-
alyzed by Janeba (1998) in which both countries are ready to liberalize capital. Therefore
the model incorporates all the features of the previous studies and discusses endogenous
determination of each exporting country's capital liberalization policies.
Tab. 3.1: Payo Matrix for the Subgames
Country 1
Country 2
2 = C 2 = O
1 = C W
CC
1 ;W
CC
2 W
CO
1 ;W
CO
2
1 = O W
OC
1 ;W
OC
2 W
OO
1 ;W
OO
2
For the succeeding discussion, I rst summarize the results of the BS model and Janeba
(1998) as well as some other derivations necessary for the analysis.
7Each country cannot discriminate the subsidy policy between domestic-owned and foreign owned rms
when they are free to locate in either country. See Haupt and Peters (2005) for analysis on discriminate
subsidy policies.
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3.3 The BS Model as Subgame CC
Subgame CC is nothing but the BS model exploring governments' incentives to subsidize
the own exporting rms when each rm cannot relocate abroad. The important results in
Section 2.5 are shown below for the later analysis.
Each country's reaction function for its own welfare maximization is given by
RiB(sj) =
1
4
(i   sj): (2-23)
The associated reaction curve of country i is shown by RiRi0 in Figure 3.1. The inter-
section labeled B represents the equilibrium subsidy rate of country as below.
sCCi = s
B
i =
4i   j
15
(i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i): (2-24)
The associated equilibrium welfare of each exporting country is expressed by
WCCi = Wi
 
sCC

= 2

4i   j
15
2
= cWBi (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i): (2-26)
i is dened in Section 2.5 as i := 1   2ci + cj > 0(i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i) for positive
quantities under duopoly. Since 1   2 = 3(c2   c1) holds, their ratio 1=2 serves as the
indicator of rm 1's relative productivity or eciency to rm 2 and is very useful
for the analysis in this chapter.
In the succeeding discussion, The equilibrium results are conned to the cases when
the outputs of both rms are non-negative, i.e., xBi (s
CC)  0, which is equivalent to the
following assumption.8
Assumption 3.1.
1
4
 1=2  4.
In view of (2-24), Assumption 3.1 also ensures sCCi (i = 1; 2)  0, which means that each
country has a non-negative incentive to subsidize its own exports. For the later analysis,
I show that there exists a unique rate of subsidy s^i in each country i such that:
Lemma 3.1. For s^i
 
:= i
5

, there holds s > RiB (s) if and only if s > s^i (i = 1; 2).
s^i in Lemma 3.1 plays an important role to determine each government's best-response
subsidy when the countries liberalize capital. In fact, when the subsidy rate of country
j, sj exceeds s^i, country i cannot attract rm j with relocatability by choosing the best-
response subsidy RiB(sj), since R
iB(sj) becomes strictly lower than sj. As shown in Fig.
3.1, s^i is determined by the intersection of the reaction curve R
iBRiB0 and 45 Line. In
subgame CC, each country has an incentive to set relatively high subsidy rates due to the
policy of banning inward direct investment from abroad. However, as discussed later, when
allowing capital inow, the governments lose the incentives to choose high subsidy rates,
for such high subsidy rates lead the rent run out to those moved-in foreign rms.
8In view of (2-25), it yields xBi
 
sCC

= x^Bi =
2(4i j)
15 .
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45
R1B
R1B0
R2B0
R2B
B
s2
s10 s^1s
B
1 = s
CC
1
s^2
sB2 = s
CC
2
Fig. 3.1: Export Subsidization Warfare Equilibrium
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3.4 Subgames OC, CO { Unilateral Capital Liberal-
ization
Based on the above results of subgames CC, I next explore the two subgames in which
only one exporting country liberalizes capital, i.e., subgames OC and CO. Since the two
subgames can be solved in the same logic, I only focus on the analysis for subgame OC.
I impose the following assumptions to examine the subsidy game.
Assumption 3.2. When a rm can relocate its production plant between countries 1 and
2, it must be subject to the following constraints.
(i) The rm cannot change the location of the headquarter for management.
(ii) The rm cannot undertake production simultaneously in both countries.
(iii) The same total production cost function is available whether the rm locates the plant
in country 1 or 2.
(iv) The rm stays in the own country when the two countries set the same subsidy rates.
In view of the above assumptions, (i) species that the rm repatriates the prot
to its parent country (the source country) irrespective of location choice. (ii) assumes
indivisibility in production. In order to focus on the subsidy competition between the
exporting countries, (iii) assumes that each rm's cost function is independent of its own
and its rival rm's location. The tie-breaking rule in (iv) excludes more complicated mixed
strategies which are beyond the scope of this chapter.
Assumption of 3.2-(iii) plays a crucial role in the analysis in this chapter since it makes
the study concentrate on the subsidy competition in aecting the rms' location decisions.9
The assumption can be rationalized as follows. If labour is the single factor of production
and production technology has constant returns to scale, each rm's cost function can be
written as C(xi) = (aiwi + i)xi + F where ai; wi; i and F are, respectively, the labour
coecient, wage rate, transport cost and sunk cost (or xed cost) of rm i. Consider two
similar countries in European Union with the same wage rate. If they export the products
to Japan, then the transport costs do not dier each other. Also, the xed cost to set
up a plant is possibly symmetric when the two countries are under similar infrastructure
conditions. Thus, each rm's cost function is indierent to the location choice. Since the
transport cost and xed cost do not aect the qualitative analysis result in the third-market
model, I assume them away for simplicity.
The properties of each country's reaction function as well as its welfare function (i.e.,
the payo) are shown to obtain the equilibrium.
9Ishikawa and Komoriya (2009a,b), the two parallel papers examined the role of location-specic cost
functions in aecting the rms' location choices. The rst one endogenized the location decisions, while
the latter one focused on the domestic welfare analysis given plant locations.
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3.4.1 Country 1's Best Response
Let me rst deal with country 1's best response. Since country 1's choice of subsidy rate
aects rm 2's decision on where to build the plant, country 1 must take account of rm
2's reaction when choosing the best-response subsidy policy. The following strategies are
undertaken to elucidate country 1's best-response subsidy policy given s2.
1st step Characterize country 1's optimal subsidy given either (i) the policy of attracting
rm 2 to the own country (hereafter the attracting policy) or (ii) the policy of
refusing rm 2 (hereafter the non-attracting policy).
2nd step Choose the policy realizing the higher welfare between the attracting policy and
the non-attracting policy.
Best Attracting Policy for Country 1
Consider country 1's optimal decision on the subsidy rate when it succeeds in attracting
rm 2 given s2. Its associated welfare denoted as V
a
1 can be expressed as:
V a1 (s1) := W1 (s1; s1)  s1xB2 (s1; s1)
 
=
(1 + s1)
2
9
  s1 (1 + 2 + 2s1)
3
!
; (3-1)
which is maximized at
sa1 := argmaxfs1g
V a1 (s1) =  
(1 + 32)
10
< 0: (3-2)
Since rm 2 never moves out of country 1, it is the best for country 1 to tax the duopoly
rent of rm 2 through taxation, i.e., sa1 < 0. Country 1's best-response subsidy given its
policy of attracting rm 2, denoted by  a1 (s2) is s
a
1 when s2 < s
a
1 and s2 +  otherwise.
The best-response subsidy and the corresponding maximized welfare level expressed by
V a1 (s2) := sups1fV a1 (s1)js1 > s2g are shown in Table 3.2.
The associated equilibrium outputs of the rms are given by
xB1 (s
a) =
32
30

3
1
2
  1

;
xB2 (s
a) =
2
30

7  1
2

;
in view of (2-25) and (3-2). The outputs of both rms are non-negative only when 1
2
2
[1
3
; 7]. Likewise, it requires 2
1
2 1
3
; 7

for subgame CO. Since the outputs of both rms
are assumed to be non-negative, I replace Assumption 3.1 with the following stronger one
throughout the rest of the chapter.
Assumption 3.3. 1
3
 1=2  3.
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Best Non-Attracting Policy for Country 1
Once country 1 bans any inward direct investment from abroad, its welfare is just the
same as in the benchmark case of the BS model, i.e., W1 (s) and its best-response subsidy
R1(s2) =
1 s2
4
. However, as shown in Lemma 3.1, this best-response subsidy of country
1 exceeds country 2's subsidy rate if s2 < s^1, so that country 1 is forced to accept rm 2.
Given its non-attracting policy, country 1 cannot then employ R1(s2), but must match s2
for its welfare maximization.
Therefore, country 1's best-response subsidy against s2 under the non-attracting pol-
icy, denoted by  n1 (s2) and the associated maximized welfare level denoted by V
n
1 (s2) :=
maxs1fW1(s)js1  s2g are summarized in Table 3.2. 10
Tab. 3.2: Best-Response Subsidy and Welfare for Country 1
Best Attracting Policy Best Non-attracting Policy
Range Best response Maximum Range Best response Maximum
of s2 subsidy  
a
1(s2) payo V
a
1 (s2) of s2 subsidy  
n
1 (s2) payo V
n
1 (s2)
s2 < s
a
1 s
a
1
 5sa21  (1+32)sa1+21
9
s2 < s^1 s2
(1 2s2)(1+s2)
9
s2  sa1 s2 + "  5s
2
2 (1+32)s2+21
9
s2  s^1 1 s24 (1 s2)
2
8
Policy Switch for Country 1
Fig. 3.2 shows the associated maximized welfare for country 1 summarized in Table 3.2.11
The curve labeled A1A2BA3 illustrates the welfare under the attracting policy, while the
curve labeled N 01BN2N3 shows the welfare under the non-attracting policy.
12
Given country 2's subsidy s2, country 1 can choose whether to accept rm 2's direct
investment by strategically selecting its own subsidy rate. As shown in Figure 3.2, the two
welfare curves for the two policies intersect at s2 = 0, for country 1 cannot extract rm 2's
rent through zero subsidy rate. One can also prove that under Assumption 3.3 the curve
N 01B is always below the curve A1A2B, assuring a unique intersection of the two payo
curves at s2 = 0.
Therefore, country 1's best-response subsidy against s2 when taking into account its
choice between the attracting and non-attracting policies, denoted by  1(s2), is summarized
in the following Lemma.
10In the table, "(> 0) represents a suciently small positive number.
11I set 1 = 1 and 2 = 76 when drawing the welfare curves in Figure 3.2. It is harmless to set the other
values of 1and 2 under the constrain in Assumption 3.3 and get the same result.
12The curve N 01BN2N
0
3 associated with the function W1 =
(1 2s2)(1+s2)
9 is tangent to the curve
N1N2N3 associated with W1 =
(1 s2)2
8 at s2 = s^1 = 1=5. This is not a coincidence, for the best-
response subsidy rates are the same both under the attracting and non-attracting policies.
30
Ocountry 1's welfare
s21s
a
1
A1
N 01
A2
B
A3
N2 N3
N1
s^1
N 03
A0
Fig. 3.2: Country 1's Payo in Subgame OC
Lemma 3.2. Country 1's best response  1(s2) should satisfy
 1(s2) =
(
 a1(s2) for s2 < 0
 n1 (s2) for s2  0
:
Or more precisely, it can be expressed as
 1(s2) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
sa1 for s2 2 ( 1; sa1)
s2 + " for s2 2 [sa1; 0)
0 for s2 = 0
s2 for s2 2 (0; s^1]
R1(s2) for s2 2 (s^1;+1)
;
where "(> 0) is a suciently small positive number.
Country 1's reaction curve is illustrated by the mixture of the thick real and broken
curves, i.e., the curve labeled A1A20A3R1 in Fig. 3.3.
3.4.2 Country 2's Best Response
Best Attracting Policy for Country 2
As to country 2's best responses, rst consider the case in which given s1, country 2
succeeds in attracting (or more precisely keeping) rm 2 at home. The welfare is just the
same as in the benchmark case of the BS model, i.e., W2(s). The best-response subsidy is
also given by the reaction function (2-23), i.e., R2B(s1). Likewise, as stated in Lemma 3.1,
when s1 is suciently high and greater than s^2, country 2's best-response subsidy R
2B(s1)
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Fig. 3.3: Country 1's Reaction Curve in Subgame OC
becomes lower than country 1's subsidy s1. In this case, country 2 is forced to match its
subsidy with country 1's so as to keep rm 2 at home.
Given country 2's attracting policy, its best-response subsidy rate denoted by  a2(s1)
and the maximized welfare denoted by V a2 (s1) are summarized in Table 3.3.
Best Non-Attracting Policy for Country 2
Next consider the case in which country 2 has decided not to attract rm 2 (or more
precisely, country 2 decided to keep rm 2 away from home). In this case, the subsidy
rate chosen by country 2 does not aect the market outcomes at all. Thus, its maximized
welfare denoted by V n2 (s1) depends only on country 1's subsidy rate and exactly equals to
rm 2's prot, i.e., B2 (s1; s1).
Since country 2 succeeds in keeping rm 2 away from home only with s2 < s1, its best-
response subsidy against s1 given the non-attracting policy, denoted by  
n
2 (s1), is given by
( 1; s1) as shown in Table 3.3.
Tab. 3.3: Best-Response Subsidy and Welfare for Country 2
Best Attracting Policy Best Non-attracting Policy
Range Best response Maximum Range Best response Maximum
of s1 subsidy  
a
2(s1) payo V
a
2 (s1) of s1 subsidy  
n
2 (s1) payo V
n
2 (s1)
s1 < s^2
2 s1
4
(2 s1)2
8
s1  s^2 s1 (2 2s1)(2+s1)9 all s1 ( 1; s1) (2+s1)
2
9
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Policy Switch for Country 2
In Fig. 3.4, the curve named A1BCA
0
2 shows the maximized welfare of country 2 given the
attracting policy and the curve named N1BN2 corresponds the non-attracting policy.
country 2's welfare
s1
s^2s1
A1
B
C
A2
N1
N2
A01
A02
0
Fig. 3.4: Country 2's Payo in Subgame OC
Country 2 chooses the attracting policy only when there holds
V a2 (s1) > V
n
2 (s1): (3-3)
In view of the results in Table 3.3, two cases are discussed for solving the above in-
equality.
Case 1: When s1  s^2, (3-3) can be rewritten as below.
(2   2s1)(2 + s1)
9
>
(2 + s1)
2
9
; or 0 > (2 + s1) s1:
The above inequality never holds for s1 > s^2(> 0), so it is better for country 2 to employ
the non-attracting policy, i.e., ( 1; s1).
Case 2: When s1 < s^2, (3-3) now becomes
(2   s1)2
8
>
(2 + s1)
2
9
; or s21   342s1 + 22 > 0:
The inequality holds for s1 <
 
17  12p2 2 or s1 >  17 + 12p2 2. Since (0 <
)
 
17  12p2 2 < s^2 = 25 <  17 + 12p2 2, there holds V a2 (s1) > V n2 (s1) for s1 < 
17  12p2 2. In the following discussion, I dene:
s1 :=

17  12
p
2

2 > 0 (3-4)
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for brevity of exposition.13 The best-response subsidization policy of country 2 can be
summarized as follows.
 2(s1)
8><>:
=  a2(s1) (= R
2(s1)) for s1 < s1
= f a2 (s1)g [ f n2 (s1)g (= fR2 (s1)g [ ( 1; s1)) for s1 = s1
=  n2 (s1) (= ( 1; s1)) otherwise
The associated reaction curve of country 2 is depicted as the segment R2D and the
shaded region excluding the dotted boundary in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. As Krishna (1989)
addressing equivalence between quotas and taris in duopoly, it is discontinuous at s1 = s1.
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Fig. 3.5: Pure Strategy Equilibrium when 1=2  mix in Subgame OC
3.4.3 Equilibrium under Unilateral Capital Liberalization
The results in the previous sections imply several possible equilibria. But they are classied
into the following two cases.
 Case I: Nash equilibrium in pure-strategy (See Figure 3.5)
 Case II: Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategy (See Figure 3.6)
13s1=2 = 17  12
p
2 / 1712  
p
2 > 0.
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Fig. 3.6: Mixed Strategy Equilibrium when 1=2 > mix in Subgame OC
Comparison of the two gures indicates that the pure-strategy equilibrium is possible if
and only if s1  sCC1 holds, i.e., 1=2  mix
 
:= 64  45p2 2 (0; 1) holds 14. As shown
in Krishna (1989), it is straightforward to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Depending on the value of 1=2, there emerge two types of equilibria
for subgame OC as follows.
P3.1.1 For 1=2  mix
 
:= 64  45p2 2 (0; 1), the same pure-strategy equilibrium as in
subgame CC is realized.
P3.1.2 Otherwise, a mixed-strategy equilibrium is realized where country 1 (having em-
ployed O) chooses s1 with probability unity and country 2 (having employed C)
randomizes over R2B(s1) and ( 1; s1).
The above Proposition implies that when the rm in the capital liberalizing country
is much less productive than the rival rm, the capital liberalizing country behaves as in
subgame CC, subsidizing the domestic rm to maximize its own welfare. The rival country,
which is a much more productive country has strong incentive to subsidize the national
rm itself. Otherwise, the capital liberalizing country sets a lower subsidy than the welfare-
maximized subsidy in subgame CC, since the rival country is not so much productive and
may set a lower subsidy or tax to let the rm move abroad to achieve higher welfare.
14It is straightforward to derive sCC1   s1 = 4215
n
1
2

   64  45p2o. One should also note mix >
1=3, as shown by mix   13 = (64  45
p
2)  13 / 191  135
p
2 / 191135  
p
2 > 0.
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3.4.4 Characterization of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria for Subgame
OC
Since the pure-strategy equilibrium for subgame OC is the same as in subgame CC, I focus
on the mixed-strategy equilibrium as 1=2 > mix shown in Figure 3.6 and characterize
its comparison with subgame CC.
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
Start at the equilibrium subsidy pair given by point ECC with s
CC
2 > s
CC
1 .
15 Given sCC1 ,
country 2 nds it better to let rm 2 go abroad and thus lowers its subsidy rate below sCC1 .
When country 2 chooses the subsidy rate slightly below sCC1 shown by point F , country 1
also has an incentive to cut its subsidy rate so as to spare the subsidy expenses to rm 2,
which is then matched by the further subsidy decrease by country 2. This race of subsidy
reduction continues along the 45 line until reaching point B where country 2 nds it
indierent to keeping rm 2 at home with R2B (s1) (point D) and letting it move abroad
with s2 2 ( 1; s1) (the segment BB0 ) when country 1 chooses s1.
Let me further characterize this mixed strategy of country 2. For this purpose, let 
represent the equilibrium probability of country 2 choosing R2B (s1) and 1    the prob-
ability of its choosing other subsidy rates smaller than s1. The equilibrium value of 
can be obtained by analyzing country 1's optimization behavior. Denote WOCm1 (s1) as the
expected welfare of country 1 in the mixed-strategy, where the superscript Cm represents
that country 2 employs a mixed strategy on export subsidies. Given , WOCm1 (s1) is given
by
WOCm1 (s1) = W1
 
s1; R
2B(s1)

+ (1  )V a1 (s1)
=

9
  1 + 2s1  R2B(s1)  1   s1  R2B(s1)
+ (1  )

(1 + s1)
2
9
  s1 (1 + 2 + 2s1)
3

;
where use was made of (2-26) and (3-1). Dierentiation with respect to s1 yields
9
dWOCm1 (s1)
ds1
= 
 
1   4s1  R2B(s1)

+ (1  ) ( 1   32   10s1) :
Since it must hold that lims1!s1
dWOCm1 (s1)
ds1
= 0,  can be derived as
 =
4 (1 + 32 + 10s1)
81 + 112 + 25s1
=
1=2 + 173  120
p
2
21=2 + 109  75
p
2
; (3-5)
15The following discussion assumes sCC2 > s
CC
1 . However, the same analysis applies even when s
CC
2 
sCC1 with some modications in Figure 3.6.
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by virtue of s1 = (17   12
p
2)2 in (3-4). Using  in the above equation, the expected
welfare of each country in the mixed-strategy equilibrium is given by
WOCm1 := W1
 
s1; R
2B(s1)

+ (1  )V a1 (s1); (3-6)
WOCm2 := W2
 
s1; R
2B (s1)

=
(2 + s1)
2
9
: (3-7)
3.4.5 Welfare Comparison between Subgames CC and OC
As implied by the discussion in the previous section, country 2 banning inward direct
investment is sure to get better o in subgame OC than in subgame CC, i.e., WOCm2 >
WCC2 . This is because its welfare at point D is strictly higher than at E along its reaction
curve R2R20 in Figure 3.6.
However, as to country 1, it is not clear at the rst glance at the gure whether it is
better o in subgame OC than in subgame CC. This is because, compared with E, there
are (i) the losses both from the higher subsidy of country 2 and the failure to optimize its
subsidy rate when country 2 sets R2 (s1), and (ii) the gain from lowering the subsidy and
the loss from rent outow due to subsidizing rm 2 when country 2 chooses s2 2 (s1; 1).
However, some tedious calculations in Appendix 3.A show that country 1 gets worse o in
subgame OC than in subgame CC.
Lemma 3.3. Given 1=2 > mix (i.e., with a mixed-strategy equilibrium), W
CC
1 > W
OCm
1
holds.
Therefore, in the mixed-strategy equilibrium, unilateral capital liberalization makes the
country liberalizing capital worse o and the country banning capital inow better o.
Note that subgame CO can be solved in the same way as subgame OC. That is, sub-
game CO yields pure-strategy equilibrium for 1=2  1=mix and mixed-strategy equilib-
rium for 1=2 < 1=mix. The other correspondent results also apply. Lastly, I turn to
examine the equilibrium in subgame OO.
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3.5 Subgame OO { Mutual Capital Liberalization
Subgame OO is an extension of the BS model explored by Janeba (1998) in which both
exporting countries liberalize capital, i.e., the two exporting rms can freely choose their
locations for production. The analysis makes sense only when both countries have already
decided to accept inward direct investment from abroad.
Using the same approach as the previous section, I reexamine the result in Janeba
(1998). When both exporting countries have liberalized capital, each rm's strategic loca-
tion choice depends on the subsidy rates chosen by the two countries. The country oering
a higher subsidy can attract both rms, but suers from the foreign rent outow. Taxation
can restrain this rent outow, but induces both rms to go abroad, leading to a loss in tax
revenue. To derive country 1's best response subsidy, I rst show the associated welfare as
below.
V1(s1; s2) =
8<:
W1(s1; s1)  s1x2(s1; s1) when s1 > s2
W1(s1; s2) when s1 = s2
W1(s2; s2) + s2x1(s2; s2) when s1 < s2
Based on the analyses in the previous section, country 1's best-response subsidy in
subgame OO is identical to its best attracting policy in subgame OC when s1 > s2, and
its best non-attracting policy in subgame CO when s1 < s2. Thus, country 1's best
response subsidy against s2 and the associated maximized welfare level are summarized in
the following table.
Tab. 3.4: Best-Response Subsidy and Welfare for Country 1 in subgame OO
Best Attracting Policy Neutral Policy Best Non-attracting Policy
Range Best Maximum Range Best Maximum Range Best Maximum
of s1 Res. Payo of s1 Res. Payo of s1 Res. Payo
s2 < s
a
1 s
a
1
 5sa21  (1+32)sa1+21
9
s1  sa1 s2 + "  5s
2
2 (1+32)s2+21
9
all s1 s2
(1 2s2)(1+s2)
9
all s1 ( 1; s2) (1+s2)29
In the above tabular, the best (non-)attracting policy is the policy (not) attracting the
foreign rm, while the neutral policy is the policy setting the same subsidy rate as the rival
country. In Figure 3.7, the curve named A1A2A3 shows the maximized welfare of country
1 given the attracting policy, N1N2 the maximized welfare given the non-attracting policy
and U1U2 the welfare given the equalized subsidy rates. From the gure, it is easy to show
that the (non-)attracting policy always yields the highest welfare given s2 < 0(> 0) and
the three curves intersect at s2 = 0.
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Ocountry 1's welfare
s2 1 sa1
A1
N1
A2
A3
N2
N1
U2
A0
U1
Fig. 3.7: Country 1's Payo in Subgame OO
Thus, country 1's best response subsidization policy is given as below.
e 1(s2)
8>>><>>>:
= sa1 for s2 2 ( 1; sa1)
= s2 + " for s2 2 [sa1; 0]
= ( 1; 0] for s2 = 0
= ( 1; s2) for s2 > 0
s1
s2
45
sa1
R1
ECC
R2
R01
R02
Fig. 3.8: Country 1's Reaction Curve in Subgame OO
Intuitively, country 1's best response subsidization policy can be explained as below.
When s2 < 0, country 1 is better o to impose a lower tax to gain tax revenue. Given
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the attracting policy, country 1's welfare is maximized at s1 = s
a
1 < 0. Thus, if s2 < s
a
1,
country 1 should set the subsidy rate at sa1, while if s2  sa1, country 1 reacts to set at s2+"
to attract both rms. However, when s2 > 0, country 1 is better o to induce subsidy
rent inow to let both rms locate abroad. Thus, the best response is a bit lower subsidy
s2   ". When the rival country is in free trade that s2 = 0, country 1 is indierent to the
attracting and non-attracting policy.
Since both countries liberalize capital, country 2's best response is symmetric to country
1. The unique equilibrium that both countries entail free trade can be shown in Figure
3.9.16
s1
s2
45
sa1
ECC
R2
R01sa2
Fig. 3.9: Equilibrium in Subgame OO
Lemma 3.4 (Janeba (1998)). When the two exporting countries open their domestic mar-
kets allowing foreign capital inow, the equilibrium subsidy of each exporting country equals
zero.
There never exists an equilibrium with either strictly positive or negative subsidies.
Janeba (1998)'s result elucidated how the mutual capital liberalization by both countries
(or the relocatability of both rms) aects the governments' subsidization incentives.
The associated equilibrium welfare of each exporting country is expressed by
WOOi :=
2i
9
(i = 1; 2) : (3-8)
16Figure 3.9 shows the case when c1 < c2. The unique equilibrium is irrespective of cost conditions.
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In view of (2-22) and (3-8), the welfare dierence between subgames CC and OO is
given by WCCi   WOOi =
72i 16ij+22j
225
. Given Assumption 3.3 that 1=2 2 [13 ; 3], the
following proposition holds.
Proposition 3.2. Mutual capital liberalization makes
P3.2.1 both exporting countries strictly better o for 1
2
2

8 5p2
2
; 8+5
p
2
7

,
P3.2.2 country 1 better o but country 2 worse o for 1
2
2
h
1
3
; 8 5
p
2
2

,
P3.2.3 country 1 worse o but country 2 better o for 1
2
2

8+5
p
2
7
; 3
i
.
Janeba (1998) demonstrated that the exporting countries are better o when both
allowing foreign capital inow. However his result critically hinges on the assumption that
both rms have the same cost conditions, i.e., 1=2 = 1. When the cost conditions dier
suciently to have 1=2 =2
h
8 5p2
2
; 8+5
p
2
7
i
, the more productive country gets worse o and
the less productive country is better o. The intuition behind is as follows. de Meza (1986)
showed that the more productive country has the greater incentive to subsidize its exports
when both exporting countries ban inward direct investment. Large cost asymmetry causes
large subsidy dierential between the exporting countries, but this subsidy dierential is
eliminated when both countries allow capital inow. Hence, the more productive country
cannot secure the large duopoly rent through highly strong subsidization, and the less
productive country no longer suers from the cost disadvantage in the subsidy competition.
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3.6 Full Equilibria for the Capital Liberalization Game
3.6.1 Second-Stage Subgame Equilibria
The subgame equilibria for the second stage are completed. In view of Proposition 3.1,
concerning subgame OC and the range of 1=2 in Assumption 3.3, the equilibria can be
classied into 3 types as shown in Figure 3.10 where E12 = (W
12
1 ;W
12
2 ) (i 2 fC;Og)
denotes the equilibrium of subgame 12 in Table 3.1.
17
Type M1 Type M2Type B
EOC =
(
W
CC
1
,W
CC
2
)
ECO =
(
W
CmO
1
,W
CmO
2
) EOC =
(
W
OCm
1
,W
OCm
2
)
ECO =
(
W
CmO
1
,W
CmO
2
) EOC =
(
W
OCm
1
,W
OCm
2
)
ECO =
(
W
CC
1
,W
CC
2
)
W
OO
2
< W
CC
2
W
OO
2
> W
CC
2
W
OO
1
> W
CC
1
W
OO
1
< W
CC
1
1/3 βmix 1/βmix8−5
√
2
2
8+5
√
2
7
β (:= β1/β2)
3
1
Fig. 3.10: Classication of Equilibria for the Subgames
 Type B for 1=2 2 (mix; 1=mix): Unilateral capital liberalization yields mixed-
strategy equilibria by the country banning inward direct investment.
 Type Mi(i = 1; 2) for i=j  mix(i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i): Country i's unilateral capital
liberalization yields the same pure-strategy equilibrium as in subgame CC, while the
other country j(6= i)'s unilateral capital liberalization yields an equilibrium with a
mixed strategy employed by country i.
Figure 3.10 also summarizes welfare comparisons among possible subgame equilibria
by virtue of Proposition 3.2.18 One should note that for any possible values of 1=2, at
least one country will employ mixed strategy in either subgame OC or CO.
17See also footnote 14 to conrm mix 2 (1=3; 1) and thus 1=mix 2 (1; 3)
18mix <
8 5p2
2 < 1 holds, which is given by:
mix   8  5
p
2
2
= 64  45
p
2  8  5
p
2
2
= 60
 
1  17
p
2
24
!
< 0:
The above inequation also implies 1=mix > 28 5p2 =
8+5
p
2
7 . Thus 1=2 2 ( 8 5
p
2
2 ;
8+5
p
2
7 ) is always in
the range of Type B as shown in Figure 3.10.
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Proposition 3.3. For all the possible relevant values of 1=2 2 [1=3; 3], there always exist
subgames of unilateral capital liberalization yielding mixed-strategy equilibria.
Lastly, let me deal with the full-game equilibria for the capital liberalization game
with strategic subsidization. Due to qualitative symmetry, only Types M2 and Type B
Equilibria are examined.
3.6.2 Type M2 Equilibria
For 1=2 2 [1=mix; 3], the relevant payo matrix at the rst stage is shown by the follow-
ing Table 3.5. I demonstrate rst that C strongly dominates O for country 1. Lemma 3.3
indicates that WCC1 > W
OCm
1 when country 2 chooses C, while Figure 3.10 (or Proposition
3.2) shows that WCC1 > W
OO
1 when country 2 chooses O. Thus O is a dominated strategy
for country 1 and can be deleted for consideration. Since country 2 is indierent to C and
O given 1 = C, there hold two equilibria (Close, Close) and (Close, Open), which yield
the same payos (WCC1 ;W
CC
2 ).
19
Tab. 3.5: 1st-Stage Payo Matrix for Type M2
Country 1
Country 2
2 = C 2 = O
1 = C W
CC
1 ;W
CC
2 W
CC
1 ;W
CC
2
1 = O W
OCm
1 ;W
OCm
2 W
OO
1 ;W
OO
2
When the cost dierence is large enough, the more productive country subsidizes the
national rm itself and does not let the rm move aboard even though the rival country
liberalizes capital. Therefore, the less productive country is indierent to closing and
opening the market without fear of attracting the foreign rm.
3.6.3 Type B Equilibrium
For 1=2 2 (mix; 1=mix), the relevant payo matrix at the rst stage is shown by Table
3.6. As for country 1, WCC1 > W
OCm
1 holds against country 2's choice of C, while W
CmO
1 >
WOO1 holds against country 2's choice of O.
20 Thus C is the dominant strategy for country
1. Since the payo structure is qualitatively symmetric, C is also the dominant strategy
for country 2. Thus (Close,Close) is the dominant strategy equilibrium. Note Type B
Equilibrium also includes the symmetric cost case when 1=2 = 1.
19Likewise for Type M1 with 1=2 2 [1=3; mix], the equilibria are (Close, Close) and (Open, Close),
which also yield the same payos.
20In subgame OC, comparison between WOO2 =
22
9 in (3-8) and W
OCm
2 =
(2+s1)
2
9 in (3-7) yields
WOCm2 > W
OO
2 since s2 > 0 by virtue of (3-4). Symmetric formulas apply in subgame CO, so W
CmO
1 >
WOO1 also holds.
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Tab. 3.6: 1st-Stage Payo Matrix for Type B
Country 1
Country 2
2 = C 2 = O
1 = C W
CC
1 ;W
CC
2 W
CmO
1 ;W
CmO
2
1 = O W
OCm
1 ;W
OCm
2 W
OO
1 ;W
OO
2
3.6.4 Welfare at Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
In view of the above results, the resulting equilibrium welfare of both countries are the
same as the relevant equilibrium welfare in subgame CC.
The results of the full-game are summarized into the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.4. In the capital liberalization game in which both exporting countries can
choose whether to liberalize capital,
P3.4.1 mutual capital liberalization (Open, Open) is never realized at a pure-strategy subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium, while mutual capital restriction (Close, Close) is always
realized;
P3.4.2 in all pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, the equilibrium welfare of each
country is the same as when both countries ban inward direct investment from
abroad;
P3.4.3 Unilateral capital liberalization is chosen by the less productive exporting country
when the cost dierence is large enough.
Although Janeba (1998) discussed mutual capital liberalization by exporting countries,
such an outcome cannot be realized as a pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
when endogenizing each country's decision on capital liberalization. Therefore, there need
some additional coordination mechanisms for mutual capital liberalization. Furthermore,
as implied by Proposition 3.2, mutual capital liberalization does not necessarily improve
the welfare of both exporting countries if the cost dierence is large enough.
3.6.5 World Welfare
As for the third country, which is a country importing the goods from Country 1 and 2,
its welfare can be expressed as WCC3 =
2(1+2)2
25
for subgame CC, and WOO3 =
(1+2)2
18
for
subgame OO.
Clearly, WCC3 > W
OO
3 holds, i.e., the third country is always worse o under mutual
capital liberalization than mutual capital restriction. This is because in subgame CC, the
two countries subsidize their exports and thereby expand the total sales to the third coun-
try, which means an improvement of the importing country's terms of trade. Furthermore,
comparison of world welfare between the two cases yields
P3
i=1W
CC
i >
P3
i=1W
OO
i .
44
The result is in a sense obvious when the two exporting rms have the same cost
conditions. That is, given the world social marginal cost of production, which is equal to
the subsidy-exclusive marginal cost of each rm, the exporting countries' subsidies expand
the world output, causing less distortion in oligopoly pricing.
When the exporting rms exhibit cost heterogeneity, de Meza (1986) showed that the
country with the more ecient rm has the greater incentive to subsidize its exports.
Coupled with the gains from the total output expansion, the world also gains from the
greater production eciency, i.e., cost savings due to the output expansion by the more
ecient rm and the output contraction by the less ecient one.
Proposition 3.5. The world welfare is higher under the exporting countries' mutual capital
restriction than under their mutual capital liberalization.
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3.7 Discussion
The results in this chapter are constrained in Assumption 3.2. Relaxing such special
conditions, I further discuss some other cases.
Locating in the third country If the rms can choose to locate in a third country
instead of the rival exporting country, it leads to the typical discussion in FDI literature:
export or FDI? By locating in its home country, a rm can receive subsidization from the
government, but will need to pay the transport cost to sell the product in the third-country
market. Thus, transport cost plays a crucial role. Firms' location choices are determined
by the eective production cost dierence between export and FDI. Assuming that the
cost function is independent of location, each rm chooses to locate at home if the subsidy
rate is higher than the transport cost. Therefore, in view of the values of both countries'
subsidy rates and transport costs, there are four patterns: (1) both rms export; (2) both
rms accept FDI; and (3) and (4) one rm exports and another rm accepts FDI.
The exporting countries thereby use subsidy policies to implement their choices re-
garding whether to attract the domestic rm to locate in the home country or allow the
domestic rm to invest in the third country. If the transport cost is relatively low, then
exporting countries have incentives to subsidize the rms to maximize welfare. However,
if the transport cost is relatively high, then letting the rm invest in another country to
save the transport cost improves welfare. There exists a critical value of transport cost
that optimizes welfare through its choice of attracting the domestic rm or not. Both
pure and mixed strategy equilibria may be dependent on the value of the transport cost.
Further, the exporting countries' capital liberalization for outward direct investment can
be examined.
Multiple plants In the framework of a third-market model, no rm has an incentive to
separate production in both exporting countries since the xed cost doubles. Even if the
xed cost excluded, concentrating the production in a single country with higher subsidy
rates is more protable due to the assumption of location-independent cost function and
identical transport cost.
It is not interesting to consider multiple plants in a third-market model in which the host
countries have no domestic consumption. However, if the model is changed to a reciprocal
trade model built by Brander (1981), each rm may have an incentive to set up a plant in
both countries. Consider that both exporting countries have domestic consumption and
the markets are equal in size and are segmented. The rms can choose to build one plant
in the home country and serve the foreign market by exporting or building plants in both
countries. In such a case, both transport cost and xed cost are important. Without the
xed cost, rms build two plants if and only if subsidy-inclusive transport cost is positive.
However, with xed cost, rms build two plants if and only if subsidy-inclusive transport
cost is higher than the xed cost. Therefore, in view of the values of subsidy rates, trade
cost, and xed cost, there also exist four patterns: (1) both rms build a single plant; (2)
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both rms build two plants; and (3) and (4) one rm builds a single plant and another
rm builds two plants.
Governments' subsidization incentives are dependent on the production cost asymmetry
as well as the xed cost and transport cost. If the xed cost is relatively high, then the
rms are willing to operate alone in their home countries. So, the country can subsidize the
exports to maximize its welfare. If the transport cost is relatively high, then the low-cost
country subsidizes its exports while the high-cost country is better o allowing the rm
to invest outward. The key variable lies in the production cost asymmetry related with
the xed cost and transport costs. Both countries are likely to liberalize capital for inward
direct investment since the subsidy is not needed for the foreign rm.
Prot tax Janeba (1998) discussed tax competition under capital liberalization. If each
exporting country imposes prot tax on the rms located in its territory, then the rms
choose to locate in the country with the lower prot tax. Janeba (1998) assumed that the
costs are not tax deductible, which is dierent from the pure prot tax. However, when the
costs are tax deductible, imposing prot tax does not aect rms' output decisions. Each
exporting country's welfare is just its national rm's prot plus tax revenue from the foreign
rm. Since rms' prots are independent of the prot tax, each country prefers a higher
tax rate; however a higher tax leads to a loss of the foreign rm's tax revenue. Thus, the
race to the bottom tax rate constitutes the equilibrium state under capital liberalization.
When restricting capital inow, taxing or subsidizing the domestic rm does not change
the social welfare. Thus, free trade is the equilibrium and both countries are indierent to
liberalizing and restricting capital. The result diers from that in the export subsidy case
in which free trade is not realized shown in this chapter.
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3.8 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examines the strategic subsidy policies under a four-stage capital liberalization
game by endogenizing governments' decisions on capital liberalization policy and consid-
ering asymmetric cost conditions between the exporting rms. Unlike Janeba (1998), who
discussed the welfare eect of mutual capital liberalization between the exporting coun-
tries, subgame-perfection prevents both countries from liberalizing capital as far as focusing
on pure-strategy equilibria. Furthermore, I show some pessimistic results concerning the
welfare eects of capital liberalization in oligopoly when the cost dierence is large enough
between the exporting rms.
First, as stated in Proposition 3.2, mutual capital liberalization does not Pareto-
dominate the initial state in which both countries ban inward direct investment. More
specically, when the cost conditions dier to a great extent, it benets the less productive
exporting country, but hurts the more productive one. In this case, even when some ad-
ditional measures are available to coordinate capital policies between exporting countries,
they do not choose to mutually liberalize capital.
Second, even when mutually capital liberalization benets both exporting countries and
there some measures made to improve both exporting countries' welfare, capital mobility
tends to prevent each exporting country's incentive to subsidize more the lower cost rms
as demonstrated in de Meza (1986) in the absence of capital mobility. The world gets
worse o under mutual capital liberalization, for the exporting countries lose an incentive
to subsidize their rms. In fact, when the exporting countries can coordinate their subsidy
policies, they actually nd it protable to tax, rather than subsidize their rms so as to
avoid excess competition and improve the terms of trade, which constitutes another factor
to worsen world welfare.
The most important result underlying this chapter is the determinant to subsidize the
exporting rms as discussed in de Meza (1986), i.e., the country with the more ecient
rms has the greater incentive to subsidize its exports. Since this incentive works robustly
in oligopoly, the analysis carries over to the more general model incorporating transporta-
tion costs specic to the shipping site of the exporting countries. The less productive
exporting country with the lower subsidy rate does not care capital liberalization, but the
more productive country does, which benets from capital liberalization by both export-
ing countries. A problem is that any enforced capital liberalization, as is required when
forming a common market, may hurt not only the exporting countries but also the region
forming a common market.
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Appendix
3.A Welfare Comparison WCC1 vs. W
OCm
1
Given the probability of country 2 choosing R2B (s1), the dierence of country 1's equilib-
rium welfare between subgames CC and OC is given by WCC1  WOCm1 = 2
 
41 2
15
2  
 (41 2 3s1)(41 2+9s1)
144
  (1  )21 s1(1+32) 5s21
9
, where use was made of (2-26) and (3-6).
Substituting (3-5) into the above equation yields
WCC1  WOCm1
=
14b3 + (531  375p2)b2 + (123; 150p2  174; 165)b+ (687; 225p2  971; 882)
225(109  75p2 + 2b) ;
where b = 1=2. Since b > 0 and 109 75
p
2 > 0,WCC1 > W
OCm
1 holds if and only if f(b) >
0, where f(b) := 14b3+(531 375p2)b2+(123; 150p2 174; 165)b+(687; 225p2 971; 882).
Therefore, there must have two positive and one negative solutions. Since the negative
solution can be precluded for consideration, only two positive solutions are taken into
account. Since 1=2 = mix = 64   45
p
2 2 (1=3; 1) is a critical value yielding both a
pure-strategy and a mixed one in subgame OC as stated in Proposition 3.1, it should be
one of the solutions, which can be veried by rather tedious calculations. Thus f(b) can
be factorized as below.
f(b) =
n
b  (64  45
p
2)
on
14b2 + (1; 427  1; 005
p
2)b+ (7; 613  5; 385
p
2)
o
:
Let g(b) := 14b2 + (1; 427   1; 005p2)b + (7; 613   5; 385p2). Then the discriminant
for g(b) = 0 is given by  = 3; 949; 797   2; 792; 880p2 > 0, which implies that g(b) = 0
has two distinct real roots, b1; b2(b1 < b2). Then the relation between the coecients
and the roots for quadratic equations implies b1 + b2 =
1
14
 
1; 005
p
2  1; 427 < 0 and
b1b2 =
1
14
 
7; 613  5; 385p2 < 0. These relations imply b1 < 0 < b2. Furthermore, since
g(1=3) = 1
9
 
72; 812  51; 380p2 > 0 holds, b2 < 1=3 is beyond the scope of our discussion.
To sum up, f(b) is factorized completely as below.
f(b) =
1
14
(b  b1)(b  b2)
n
b  (64  45
p
2)
o
;
where b1 < b2 < 1=3 < mix
 
= 64  45p2 < 1. The above demonstrations established
that f(b) > 0 for b 2 (1=3; 3) if and only if b > mix. This completes the proof.
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Chapter 4
International Cross Shareholding
4.1 Introduction
We have accelerated the globalization of economic activities over the last century. Rapid
growth in commodity trade has not only given rise to new trade in services, but also the cre-
ation of a global production-marketing network that is supported by direct investments and
the cross-licensing of technologies and know-how. This makes the shareholding structures
of the rms more complicated than we have experienced before. With foreign investment
liberalization, any rm nanced by equities located in the home country is never totally
owned by the domestic investors themselves. The equities are also partially owned by for-
eign investors of some other countries. In Japan, a number of major publicly traded rms
are more than 30% owned by overseas investors. A report from Nihon Keizai Shimbun
in 2004 said that the foreign shareholding of Japan's major rms increased by 74% from
the previous year and top rms such as Orix Corp. and Canon Corp. are controlled by
more than 50% by the foreign investors. Mutual shareholding among rms is becoming
widespread and foreign shareholding in rms is increasing.
Such internationalized shareholding of the rms should alter the standard welfare im-
plications of trade and industrial policies. This is because traditional policy analysis is
based on the explicit nationality of the rms involved. Domestic rms are assumed to be
100% \domestic" in the sense that their equities are all held by the domestic residents
including the \domestic" rms. The well-known argument of the strategic trade policy
toward international oligopoly shares the same assumption.
Thus, we are faced with the following question. If the shareholders of the rm are
not purely domestic residents, does the internationalized shareholding of rms aect the
decision of an individual country's government seeking its own national interest or welfare?
If it does, then how? In traditional literatures, Bhagwati and Brecher (1980), Brecher and
Bhagwati (1981) and Brecher and Findlay (1983) studied the foreign ownership under per-
fect competition using the classical approaches. Lee (1990) examined the strategic trade
policies and trade patterns by allowing the foreign ownership of rms. When both rms
compete in the home market, an increase in foreign ownership makes both the optimal
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export and import policies scale down at the same rate. The trade pattern, rm values,
and world welfare are not aected by foreign ownership; however, the distribution of world
welfare is changed. Other recent papers, such as Miyagiwa (1992), Dick (1993), and Welzel
(1995) also discussed the weaker subsidization incentive in the presence of foreign own-
ership. Long and Soubeyran (2001) obtained the \neutrality result" in the presence of
the cross ownership of a number of heterogeneous rms. Kang, Cheong, and Lee (2001)
examined the trade patterns in a three-country model, but involving intra-industry trade.
Meanwhile, internationalized shareholding also takes the form of mutual shareholding
among the rms themselves as a long-running practice. It has been typically seen that the
rms hold each other's shares in order to stabilize their management and maintain business
ties especially in Japan where is is known as keiretsu, i.e., see Lichtenberg and Pushner
(1994) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1995). Reynolds and Snapp (1986) and Malueg (1992)
studied rms' collusive behavior under mutual cross-rm shareholding. Macho-Stadler and
Verdier (1991) examined the managerial incentive where owners and managers had separate
identities and the owners showed collusive behavior among themselves. Inoue (1998) and
Kuroki (2001) examined the mutual shareholding among nancial banks. However, studies
on the strategic trade policies under mutual shareholding among rms are very limited
and it is of great interest to see whether the mutual shareholding among rms yields
any dierent implications for strategic trade policies as compared to the one among the
residents of the countries. To distinguish between these two types of mutual shareholding,
the former only among the rms is refered to as cross-rm shareholding , and the latter
only among the residents is refered to as cross-country shareholding throughout the
chapter.
Furthermore, in this chapter I introduce a mixed international cross shareholding struc-
ture, which allows a part of a rm's shares to be owned by both foreign residents and
foreign rms. This chapter investigates how the cross shareholding structure aects the
rms' market performances and government's strategic subsidization incentives. It is shown
that increasing the ratio of foreign rm's shareholding is more likely to strengthen the
country's subsidization incentive and facilitate collusion between the rms as in Krishna
(1989).1 Although the dual types of distortions imply that cross-rm shareholding should
be regulated or banned, when exporting governments engage in subsidy competition, rms'
collusion does not occur and world welfare benets from export subsidization. Therefore,
the cross-rm shareholding structure should not necessarily be banned when governments
subsidize the exports.
In the classical nancial and industrial organization theory, the diverse shareholders of
a rm may cause a unanimity problem. This chapter excludes this complexity and assumes
that shareholder unanimity is satised, that is, all of a rm's shareholders who make the
production decision unanimously desire to maximize the value of the rm's shares. Pre-
vious studies showed that under the assumption of no trade and complete information,
shareholder unanimity is supported by the so-called spanning condition: any production
1However, in the repeated-game setting, Malueg (1992) showed that increasing the degree of cross-rm
shareholding in the market may reduce the likelihood of collusion under certain demand conditions.
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plan of the rm can be written as a linear combination of the production plans of the other
rms (See Ekern and Wilson (1974), Leland (1974), and Radner (1974)). When there is
trading in the shares of rms, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) indicated that spanning does
not imply unanimity due to new information. However, if rms behave as perfect competi-
tors, the spanning condition still leads to unanimity. Hart (1979) generalized the result to
an economy with incomplete markets and showed that the competitive condition ensures
shareholder unanimity independent of the spanning condition. DeAngelo (1981) demon-
strated intuitive conditions for unanimity and formulated a general denition of market
competition. This chapter does not consider the trading of the stocks and incomplete
information, so shareholder unanimity is assumed in order to simplify the analysis.
The analysis in this chapter is based on Kiyono and Wei (2004), Wei and Kiyono
(2005). The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
cross shareholding model. Section 3 studies the optimal subsidy policies under interna-
tional cross-country shareholding and employs some specic cases to work out the results
in great details. Section 4 synthesizes both cross-country and cross-rm shareholding anal-
ysis into a mixed shareholding structure and analyzes how increasing foreign rms' share-
holding aects the optimal outputs and strategic subsidization decisions. The eects of
subsidy competition on national welfare and world welfare under cross-country and cross-
rm shareholding structures are discussed in Section 5. Finally, the conclusion is summed
up in Section 6.
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4.2 The Model
The model is a two-stage game involving governments and rms as in the BS model. Let
me rst explain the dierence between the two international cross shareholding structures:
cross-country and cross-rm shareholding. When the equities of a rm are internationally
owned by the residents of both countries, it is called the cross-country shareholding
structure. When the equities are internationally owned by the shareholders of both rms,
it is called the cross-rm shareholding structure.
Given the subsidy prole s, the prot earned by rm i through its own export is
expressed by
i(x; si) = fP (x1 + x2)  ci + sigxi (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i); (2-1)
where x = (x1; x2) denotes the output prole. Let i 2 [0; 1] denote the percentage share of
rm i's equities owned by domestic residents where i = 1; 2. Values of (1; 2) are assumed
to be exogenously given. Then, the national welfare of country i is expressed by
W i (x; s;) = i
i (x; si) + (1  j) j (x; sj)  sixi; (4-1)
where s = (s1; s2) denotes the subsidy prole and  = (1; 2) the bilateral shareholding
structure of the rms.
Without loss of generality, I assume
Assumption 4.1. i 2
 
1
2
; 1

for i = 1; 2.
Without this assumption, there is no essential meaning to refer the home rm as the
"home " rm.2
Although each government cares about its own welfare as dened in (4-1) under both
shareholding structures, the objectives of the rms are critically dierent. When there is
cross-country shareholding between the exporting countries, each rm maximizes its own
prot dened in (2-1). However, when there is cross-rm shareholding, each rm now
maximizes not its own prot but the value of the rm which is dened as the sum of the
dividends from both rms' exporting activities. The value function of rm i is given by
V i (x; s;) = i
i (x; si) + (1  j)j (x; sj) : (4-2)
Such value maximization is incomplete, for each rm can choose the amount of its own
export only and has no explicit measures for coordinating its exports and production.
Keep in mind the dierence in the objective and the constrained set of actions imposed
on the two structures. Let me rst explore the properties of cross-country shareholding
equilibrium.
2Normally, when a rm holds more than a half of the shares of the other rm, it becomes the parent rm
and thus can control it as its subsidiary rm. Corporate laws in most countries ban cross-rm shareholding
between the parent company and its subsidiary, and prescribe the maximum mutual shareholding ratio
among the rms. For example, in France is 10%; in German 25%; in Korea 40%; and in Japan 50%.
However, in Hong Kong, cross-rm shareholding is strictly prohibited.
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4.3 Cross-Country Shareholding Equilibrium
4.3.1 Second-Stage Equilibrium
As mentioned earlier, the equilibrium is solved by backward induction from the second-
stage. Firm i's reaction function denoted by riC (xj; si) is equivalent to the one in the BS
model. The superscript C shows the variables associated with the equilibrium values under
the cross-country shareholding structure:
riC(xj; si) =
1
2
(a  ci + si   xj) = riB(xj; si) (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i): (2-19)
Denote xCi (si; sj) (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i) as rm i's equilibrium output under cross-country
shareholding that is expressed by
xCi (s) =
1
3
(i + 2si   sj) = xBi (s) (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i): (2-20)
The equilibrium prot of rm i can be rewritten as Ci (s) = 
i(xCi (s); x
C
j (s); si) =
Bi (s).
Under the cross-country shareholding structure, the familiar comparative statics re-
sults are equivalent to the BS model. This is because no changes in the bilateral mutual
shareholding structure aect either rm's output decision.
4.3.2 Government's Subsidy Incentive
In the rst stage, the governments can predict the resulting second-stage equilibrium, given
their own choices regarding the subsidies. Country i's welfare is now given by
W Ci (s;)
def
= i
C
i (s) + (1  j)Cj (s)  sixCi (s):
Each government maximizes the national welfare by choosing the optimal export sub-
sidy, taking into account the responses of both rms.3 The Nash solution for the FOC
should satisfy
0 =
@W Ci (s;)
@si
= i
@Ci
@si
+ (1  j)
@Cj
@si
  xi   si@x
C
i
@si
= i
 
xiP
0(X)
@xCj
@si
+ xi
!
  xi   si@x
C
i
@si
+ (1  j)xjP 0(X)@x
C
i
@si
; (4-3)
3The SOC for each country's welfare maximization can be examined by using (4-5):
@2W Ci (s;)
@s2i
=
1
9
[8i   10  2j ] < 0;
which shows that the welfare function of each country is strictly concave with respect to its own export
subsidy.
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where use was made of (2-10) and (2-11). The terms on the right-hand side of (4-3) show
the decomposition of strategic export subsidization under the cross-country shareholding
structure. The subsidy incentive is easy to understand when it is compared to the standard
form in the BS model (i = 1 for i = 1; 2). For this purpose, (4-3) is rewritten as below.
@W Ci (s;)
@si
= xiP
0(X)
@xCj
@si
  si@x
C
i
@si
  (1  i)xiP 0(X)
@xCj
@si
  (1  i)xi + (1  j) xjP 0(X)@x
C
i
@si
:
The terms on the rst line show the subsidy incentives found in the BS model in (2-
12), while those on the second line show the new sources of subsidy incentives specic to
cross-country shareholding. For later reference, the terms on the second line are called the
additional subsidization incentives under cross-country shareholding and are denoted
as ICi (s;) for country i, that is,
ICi (s;) =   (1  i)xiP 0(X)
@xCj
@si
  (1  i)xi + (1  j)xjP 0(X)@x
C
i
@si
: (4-4)
The above three terms on the right-hand side are all strictly negative in view of (2-
8) and (2-9). The rst term   (1  i)xiP 0(X)@x
C
j
@si
represents the cross rent-shifting
eect . Export subsidy to the domestic rm, through the standard rent-shifting eect,
increases its prot, but it leads to an increase in the dividend given to the rival rm. This
eect becomes smaller in absolute terms as the domestic rm's own shares increases. In
other words, the higher the domestic rm's own share, the less the government cares about
the outow of the domestic rm's rent due to the cross rent-shifting eect.
The second term   (1  i) xi shows the subsidy outow eect , for it represents the
portion of the subsidy expense going abroad as increased dividend to the foreign residents.
Further, its absolute value decreases as the domestic rm's own share increases.
The last term (1  j) xjP 0(X)@x
C
i
@si
shows the dividend suppression eect , for it
represents the portion of the decrease in the dividend received from the shared rival rm.
The above three eects weaken the subsidy incentives in the presence of cross-country
shareholding.4
From (2-21) in the linear demand function, (4-3) can be written as
0 =
@W Ci (s;)
@si
=
1
3
[(4i   3)xi   2si   2(1  j)xj] : (4-5)
Let RiC (sj;) represent country i's reaction function. Since no changes in the cross-
country shareholding structure aect the comparative statics results for the market out-
comes, it is straightforward to derive the eect of a change in the cross-country shareholding
4Welzel (1995) and Dick (1993) also identied three similar eects on the optimal export subsidization.
Here, these three eects are used to conduct a comparison with the cross-rm shareholding case for later
analysis.
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structure on the optimal response subsidy. In view of the SOC for national welfare maxi-
mization, an application of the implicit function theorem using the result in (4-5) yields
@RiC (sj;)
@i
=  @
2W Ci =@ii@si
@2W Ci =@s
2
i
/ @
2W Ci
@ii@si
=
4
3
xi > 0:
An increase in the domestic residents' share over the domestic rm makes the government
care more about the prot of the domestic rm, and thereby, strengthens the government's
strategic export subsidy incentive.
Similarly, an increase in the foreign ownership of foreign rm leads to
@RiC (sj;)
@j
=  @
2W Ci =@jj@si
@2W Ci =@s
2
i
/ @
2W Ci
@j@si
=
2
3
xj > 0
which implies that when there is a decrease in the domestic residents' claim over the foreign
rm's prots, the domestic country's government then cares less about the decrease in the
foreign rm's prots, which gives rise to a stronger export subsidy incentive a la Brander-
Spencer.
I summarize the above results into the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. An increase in the residents' ownership share in the domestic rm induces
both governments to increase the strategic export subsidy rates.
The full-game Nash equilibrium subsidy is a solution to the following reaction function.
RiC (sj;) =
4j   4i   1
10  8i + 2j sj +
(4i   3)i   2(1  j)j
10  8i + 2j ;
where i = a  2ci + cj(i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i) is dened in Section 2.5.
The equilibrium subsidy, denoted as sCi (i; j) depends on the cross-country sharehold-
ing structure.
sCi () =
4(10i + 4j   6ij   7)i + (8i + 20j   12ij   17)j
3(33  201   202 + 1212) : (4-6)
Proposition 4.1. The equilibrium export subsidy rate under the cross-country shareholding
structure is strictly lower than that in its absence, that is, sCi () < s
C
i (1) = s
B
i .
Proof: See Appendix 4.A. 2
To clarify how the cross-country shareholding structure governs the equilibrium export
subsidy prole, let me focus on the marginal subsidy rate when si = 0 and investigate what
factors induce the government to impose export subsidies. In view of (4-5), it follows that
@W Ci (s;)
@si

si=0
= 4ixi + 2jxj   3xi   2xj: (4-7)
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Denote the market share of rm i as i = xi=X (i = 1; 2) where 1 + 2 = 1. Thus the
government has an incentive to subsidize the domestic rm if and only if 4ii+2jj (3 
j) > 0. (4-7) also yields the following lemma specic to the cross-country shareholding
structure.
Lemma 4.2. Under the cross-country shareholding structure, the government's subsidy
incentive is dependent on market share i.
2
1(1
2
; 1
2
)
1
1
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sC1 > 0
sC1 < 0
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sC2 < 0
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Fig. 4.1: Government's Subsidy Incentive under Cross-Country Shareholding
Figure 4.1 that allows the pairs of the shares letting both countries to nd a zero
subsidy optimal with respect to (4-7), where curve S1S
0
1 stands for country 1 and curve
S2S
0
2 for country 2 in the case of symmetric cost conditions. The unit square

1
2
; 1
 1
2
; 1

is divided into four areas, each representing both governments' incentives for subsidization
or taxation. Figure 4.1 implies that both governments have an incentive to provide a
subsidy only when the domestic residents' share of the domestic rm is suciently high
as represented by the shaded area. The BS model corresponds to the top corner (1; 1). In
the presence of cross-country shareholding, each government may rather tax the domestic
rm even though the residents' equity share constitutes over half of the total share. In
fact, when the residents' share is half for both rms, the governments would denitely
tax the exports. This is exactly the case when there is a single exporting country holding
two rms. When the two domestic rms compete in the export market, the competition
becomes excessive from the view point of joint prot maximization. The government thus
has an incentive to suppress, rather than promote the competition so as to maximize
national welfare.
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4.4 Cross-Firm and Mixed Shareholding Equilibrium
Next, I consider the cross-rm shareholding case in which the equities of a rm are mutually
owned by the shareholders of both rms. In the same notations, the heterogeneous cross
shareholding rates of the rms are denoted by  = (1; 2).
Firm i's value function under cross-rm shareholding is dened as the sum of fractional
prots of both rms accruing to the domestic shareholders and is denoted as:
V iF (x; s;) = i
i(x; si) + (1  j)j(x; sj) (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i); (4-2)
where superscript F shows the variables associated with the values under the international
cross-rm shareholding.
Strictly speaking, cross-rm shareholding is a special cross-country shareholding struc-
ture since the shareholders of both rms are the residents of both countries.5 In order to
distinguish between both shareholding structures, the cross-country shareholding discussed
in the previous section is dened strictly as the mutual shareholding structure among resi-
dents who are irrelative to the shareholding of the rival rms. However, due to the capital
liberalization in the stock market, a fraction of the shares of rms can be owned not only by
the foreign rival rms' shareholders, but also by the irrelative foreign residents. Separating
the cross-country and cross-rm shareholding structures is not realistic. In this chapter, I
further develop a mixed cross shareholding structure in which the foreign investors are con-
stituted by foreign individual residents and foreign rm's shareholders. I use an exogenous
variable i 2 [0; 1] to represent the weight of the foreign shareholding portion owned by
rm i's shareholders. Therefore, under the mixed shareholding structure, when a fraction
of rm j's shares are not only owned by rm i's shareholders, but also by the irrelative
country i's residents. Firm i's value function is given by
V i(x; s;; i) = i
i(x; si) + i(1  j)j(x; sj) (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i): (4-8)
The superscript  represents the variables associated with the values under the mixed
shareholding structure. When i = 1, rm j's foreign shareholding is entirely owned by
rm i's shareholders, which is the cross-rm shareholding. When i = 0, rm j's foreign
shareholding portion is entirely constituted by country i's residents, which is the cross-
country shareholding. The greater the value of i, the higher the weight of foreign rms'
shareholding. Using the form of mixed shareholding dened in (4-8) enables me to analyze
both the cross-country and cross-rm shareholding structures and compare the equilibrium
values with respect to i.
5Considering shareholders from a third country is out of the scope of my analysis.
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4.4.1 Second-Stage Equilibrium
Denote each rm's reaction function under mixed shareholding as ri(xj; ; si;; i). Given
that the SOC is satised,6 the FOC for maximizing (4-2) with respect to its own output
yields
0 =
@V i(ri(xj; ; si); xj; s;; i)
@xi
= i
 
P (X)  ci + si + ri(:)P 0(X)

+ i(1  j)xjP 0(X) (4-9)
= i
 
a  2ri(:)  xj   ci + si
  i(1  j)xj:
Solving for each rm's reaction function yields
ri(xj;; si; i) =
1
2
[a  ci + si   (1 + ii)xj] (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i); (4-10)
where i()
def
=
1 j
i
denotes the relative shareholding ratio of rm i. Note that
Assumption 4.1 assures i 2 (0; 1). Under cross-country shareholding, when i = 0,
each rm's reaction function is independent of the cross shareholding structure (1; 2) as
shown in (2-19). With the presence of foreign rm's shareholding, each rm's best response
actually depends on the cross shareholding structure (1; 2) and the weight of the foreign
rm's shareholding i. For the convenience of later analysis, one can show the following
properties of each rm's reaction function by using the implicit function theorem in (4-10).
rix (xj;; si; i)
def
=
@ri
@xj
=  1 + ii
2
< 0; (4-11)
ris (xj;; si; i)
def
=
@ri
@si
=
1
2
> 0; (4-12)
rii (xj;; si; i)
def
=
@ri
@i
=
i(1  j) xj
2(i)2
> 0; (4-13)
rij(xj;; si; i)
def
=
@ri
@j
=
ixj
2i
> 0; (4-14)
ri (xj;; si; i)
def
=
@ri
@i
=  ixj
2
< 0: (4-15)
Lemma 4.3. Given i 2 [0; 1], each rm's reaction function under cross shareholding
structure satises as following.
(i) Each rm's optimal output is a strategic substitute to the other's.
6The SOC for the value function to be strictly concave in its own output can be varied as follows.
@2V i(x; s;; i)
@x2i
=  2i < 0:
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(ii) An increase in the subsidy rate increases each rm's best-response output.
(iii) An increase in any rm's own share 1 or 2 increases each rm's best-response
output.
(iv) An increase in the weight of the foreign rm's shareholding i reduces each rm's
best-response output.
Results in Lemma 4.3 (i) and (ii) are satised under both the cross-country and cross-
rm shareholding structures. The intuition behind (iii) that is attributed to cross-rm
shareholding can be explained as follows. An increase in 1 or 2 raises the weight of the
domestic rm's marginal prot or reduces the weight of the rival rm's marginal prot in
the FOC dened in (4-9). For the FOC to satisfy, the marginal prot of the rival rm
should decrease and the domestic rm's output should increase. (iv) shows that cross-rm
shareholding is likely to facilitate collusion with the shared rms. Since foreign rms'
prots also constitute a part of the market value of the rm under cross-rm shareholding,
each rm takes into account the eect of the domestic rm's output to suppress the shared
foreign rms' prots.
The equilibrium under cross shareholding is globally stable in the standard Cournot
output adjustment process. After imposing (4-11),
(; )
def
= 1  rix rjx =
1
4
(3  ii   jj   ijij) > 0 (4-16)
is satised in view of Assumption 4.1. Hence, for all the relevant equilibria, the condition
for the stability process is satised under the mixed cross shareholding structure when
i 2 [0; 1].
4.4.2 Firms' Best-Response Outputs
From the comparative statics analysis in (4-15), the best-response output of each rm
declines with an increase in the weight of foreign rm's shareholding i. For the case under
the cross-rm shareholding, each rm's output increase suppresses the shared foreign rm's
prot and its best-response output is no larger than that under cross-country shareholding.
The equilibrium output is equal under both shareholding structures only when (i) the
shared rival rm takes no production as xj = 0, or (ii) each rm fully holds the domestic
rm's shares as i = 1(i = 1; 2). Thus, the cross-rm shareholding structure facilitates
collusion with the shared rms.
Summarize the above results into the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4. Each rm's best-response output under cross-rm shareholding is no larger
than that under cross-country shareholding. More specically, given (i; j) and xj > 0
riF (xj;; si) < r
i(xj;; si; i) < r
iC(xj; si);
where riF (xj;; si)
def
= ri(xj;; si; 1) and r
iC(xj; si)
def
= ri(xj;; si; 0).
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the related results in Lemma 4.4. riCxmi and r
iFxmi denote the
downward sloping reaction curves under cross-country and cross-rm shareholding, respec-
tively. rixmi represents the reaction curve under mixed cross shareholding and lies between
riCxmi and r
iFxmi . All the reaction curves start from the same output when the rm is
a monopolistic producer in the market. Given the rival rm's output decision, the best-
response output of each rm is always larger under cross-country shareholding than that
under cross-rm shareholding. Points NC(xC1 ; x
C
2 ), N
(x1 ; x

2 ), and N
F (xF1 ; x
F
2 ) in the
gure denote the corresponding equilibrium outputs, respectively.
x2
x1
NC
NF
r1C
r1F
r2C
r2F
xm1
xm2
r2
r1
N
Fig. 4.2: Reaction Curves under International Cross Shareholding
4.4.3 Firms' Optimal Outputs under Cross Shareholding
Denote xi (s;; ) (i = 1; 2) as rm i's equilibrium output under mixed cross shareholding,
which is expressed as below.
xi (s;; ) =
2(a  ci + si)  (1 + ii)(a  cj + sj)
4(; )
: (4-17)
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Dierentiating (4-17) with respect to si and i yields the following results.
@xi (s;; )
@si
=
1
2
> 0; (4-18)
@xj (s;; )
@si
=  1 + jj
4
< 0; (4-19)
@xi (s;; )
@i
=  ixj
2
< 0; (4-20)
@xj (s;; )
@i
=
(1 + jj)ixj
4
< 0; (4-21)
where use was made of (4-16).
Given the cross shareholding structure (; ), (4-18) and (4-19) show that the standard
eect of strategic export subsidization is unchanged. In (4-20) and (4-21), an increase in
the weight of foreign rm's shareholding i decreases the domestic rm's optimal output,
but increases the foreign rm's optimal output. However, the total eects of cross-rm
shareholding structure on the individual rm's equilibrium output is ambiguous.
Moreover, the equilibrium total output under mixed cross shareholding can be derived
as follows.
X(s;; ) =
(1  22)(a  c1 + s1) + (1  11)(a  c2 + s2)
4(; )
=
P
k=1;2(1  kk)(a  ck + sk)
4(; )
:
Note that the equilibrium total output depends on the sum of the subsidies for the countries
under cross-country shareholding when 1 = 2 = 0.
Dierentiation with i yields the following result.
@X(s;; )
@i
=
@xi (s;; )
@i
+
@xj (s;; )
@i
=  (1  jj)ixj
4(; )
< 0: (4-22)
Thus, increasing the weight of the foreign rm's shareholding always reduces the equi-
librium output, that is,
XC(s) > X(s;; ) > XF (s;);
where XC(s) def= X(s;; 0) and XF (s;) def= X(s;; 1). Such results can be summa-
rize into the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.2. 　
P4.2.1 The equilibrium total output and market price depend on the sum of the subsidy-
inclusive unit costs over the industry under cross-country shareholding when i =
0(i = 1; 2).
P4.2.2 Given the same subsidy rate, the equilibrium total output under cross-country share-
holding is always larger than that under cross-rm shareholding.
62
4.4.4 Firms' Equilibrium Prots
The equilibrium prot of each rm can be expressed as below.
i (s;; ) = [P (X
(s;; ))  ci + si] xi (s;; ):
Dierentiating the above equation with respect to si yields
@i (s;; )
@si
= (P (X)  ci + si + xiP 0(X)) @x

i
@si
+ xiP
0(X)
@xj
@si
+ xi
= iixj
@xi
@si
  xi
@xj
@si
+ xi > 0; (4-23)
@j (s;; )
@si
= (P (X)  cj + sj + xjP 0(X))
@xj
@si
+ xjP
0(X)
@xi
@si
= jjxi
@xj
@si
  xj @x

i
@si
< 0; (4-24)
where use was made of (4-9), (4-18), and (4-19). The above results yield the following
Proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Under international mixed cross shareholding structure, an increase in
the subsidy rate (i) increases the domestic rm's equilibrium output and equilibrium prot,
but (ii) reduces the other rm's equilibrium output and prot.
4.4.5 Government's Subsidy Incentive
Next solve the resulting equilibrium subsidy. In the rst stage, each government makes
its own choice over subsidy by predicting the resulting second-stage equilibrium. Under
international cross shareholding, the national welfare is measured by the value accrued
to the domestic shareholders minus the total subsidy payment made by the government.
Country i's welfare function is given by
W i (s;; )
def
= i

i (s;; ) + (1  j)j (s;; )  sixi (s;; ):
Note that although the welfare function has the same expression as the one under cross-
country shareholding, the equilibrium output and prot are actually dependent on the
weight of the foreign rm's shareholding (i; j), and so each country's welfare function is
also dependent on (i; j).
After a little manipulation by using (4-9), the FOC for welfare maximization yields
0 =
@W i (s;; )
@si
= i
@i
@si
  xi   si@x

i
@si
+ (1  j)
@j
@si
=  (1  i)(1  j)xj @x

i
@si
  (1  i)xi   i(1  ijj)xi
@xj
@si
  si@x

i
@si
; (4-25)
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where use was made of (4-23) and (4-24).7
Similar to the case of cross-country shareholding, the additional incentive terms under
the mixed cross shareholding can be extracted as below.
Ii (s;; ) = (1  i)xi
@xj
@si
  (1  i) xi   (1  j)xj @x

i
@si
+ jj(1  j)xi
@xj
@si
+ i(1  j)xj @x

i
@si
: (4-26)
The rst three terms on the rst line represent the cross rent-shifting eect ,
subsidy-outow eect, and dividend-suppression eect shown in the cross-country
shareholding case in the previous section, respectively. All of them are not dependent on
the foreign rm's shareholding ratio (1; 2).
The last two terms show the additional strategic subsidization eects in the presence
of mixed cross shareholding. The fourth term jj(1  j)xi @x

j
@si
represents the magnied
cross rent-shifting eect , and the fth term i(1  j)xj @x

i
@si
, the minied dividend
suppression eect . Due to the collusive eect under cross-rm shareholding, a further
decrease in the foreign rm's outputs increases the domestic rm's prot through the
rent-shifting eect; however, it also increases the dividend outow to the foreign rm.
Meanwhile, a decrease in the domestic rm's output mitigates the foreign rm's prot
reduction and thereby increases the dividend inow to the domestic rm.
Under cross-rm shareholding when 1 = 2 = 1, the additional incentive eect in
(4-26) can be simplied as below.
IFi (s;) = jxi
@xFj
@si
  (1  i) xi: (4-27)
A comparison with (4-4) under cross-country shareholding yields some insights as given
below. First, the dividend suppression eect vanishes, for the eect is already taken
into account by the domestic rm's output decision in value maximization; the foreign
rm's receipt of subsidy increases the domestic rm's value through an increase in dividend.
Second, the subsidy outow eect remains intact, though its value may dier due to a
change in the equilibrium output. Last, the cross rent-shifting eect is magnied by
the factor 1=jj. This multiplier eect is peculiar to cross-rm shareholding.
When the marginal subsidy rate is set as si = 0, the FOC for national welfare maxi-
mization under cross-rm shareholding yields the following result:
@W Fi (s;)
@si

si=0
=
i + j   1
j
xiP
0(X)
@xFj
@si
  (1  i)xi
=

i(j   i + 1)
j(i + j + 1)
  (1  i)

xi
=
 Fi ()
j(i + j + 1)
xi;
7The second-order condition for welfare maximization is satised. See Appendix 4.B.
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which follows from (4-16) and (4-19).  Fi () is dened as
 Fi () := ij(i + j   1) + (i   j)(j   i + 1); (4-28)
which shows that the government's subsidy incentive depends only on mutual shareholding
structure (1; 2).
Under the symmetric cross-rm shareholding structure, as 1 = 2 = ,
 Fi (; ) = ()
2(2   1) > 0;
where  > 1
2
in Assumption 4.1. Thus, it is straightforward to establish the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Under cross-rm shareholding,
P4.4.1 Each government's incentive for export subsidies is independent of the cost condi-
tions of the rms.
P4.4.2 When the percentage share of each rm's holding of the other rm's equity is equal
as 1 = 2 = , each country has an incentive to subsidize its domestic rm given
 > 1
2
.
Then, what about the subsidization incentive under both equity structures? Intuitively,
under cross-rm shareholding, each rm has to take into account the shared rm's prot
and has less incentive to increase its own output. The oligopolistic competition becomes
milder, and thereby, the government has stronger incentive to subsidize its exports to
maximize national welfare.
From (4-7) and (4-28), Figure 4.3 depicts both shareholding structures under the sym-
metric cost structure as c1 = c2 = c. The shaded areas show the positive subsidy incentives.
From Figure 4.3, it is obvious that under cross-rm shareholding, each country's govern-
ment has stronger incentive to subsidize its own rm than under cross-country shareholding.
Thus, the following Proposition can be established.
Proposition 4.5. Under cross-rm shareholding, each government has stronger incentive
to subsidize its own exports than under cross-country shareholding structure.
Proof: See Appendix 4.C. 2
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Fig. 4.3: Subsidization Incentive under Cross-Country vs. Cross-Firm Shareholding
4.4.6 Optimal Subsidy under Symmetric Cost and Shareholding
Structure
Let Ri be a solution to (4-25), which represents country i's reaction function under the
mixed cross shareholding structure. Then, the full-game Nash Equilibrium subsidy prole
denoted as si (; ) is thus a solution to
si (; ) = R
i(sj (; );; ):
Under the symmetric cost and shareholding structure, when c1 = c2 = c, 1 = 2 = 
and 1 = 2 = ,
Ri(sj;; ) =
 (1 + )(1  )sj + (1 + 2 + 3  5)(a  c)
2(2 + 5+ 2)
;
where use was made of (4-17), (4-18), and (4-19).
The properties of the above reaction function are shown as follows.
@Ri(sj;; )
@sj
=  (1 + )(1  )
2(2 + 5+ 2)
< 0;
@Ri(sj;; )
@
=
2[2 + 6+ 2(1  )] + 4(5+ 3)(+ 1)(a  c)
4(2 + 5+ 2)2
> 0:
Each country's reaction curve is downward sloping. An increase in the weight of the foreign
rm's shareholding increases each country's best-response subsidy. Given sj, country i's
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best-response subsidy under cross-rm shareholding is always larger than under cross-
country shareholding, that is, Ri(sj;; 0) = R
iC(sj;) < R
iF (sj;) = R
i(sj;; 1). This
is because under cross-rm shareholding, the rms behave more collusively, the equilibrium
outputs are suppressed, and the governments are likely to provide a higher subsidy rate.
Solving for the optimal subsidies yields
si (; ) =
1  5+ 3+ 2
5 + 11  + 2 (a  c):
An increase in the weight of the foreign rm's shareholding always increases each coun-
try's subsidy, which is given by
@si (; )
@
=
16(1 + )2
(5 + 11  + 2)2 > 0:
It is straightforward to show that under cross-rm shareholding, each country's optimal
subsidy is always higher than that under cross-country shareholding given the symmetric
structures. In more detail,
sCi () = s

i (; 0) =
6   5
11  6 (a  c);
si (; ) =
62   5 + (1  (1 + 2))
 62 + 11 + (1  )(1  2) (a  c);
sFi () = s

i (; 1) =
(2   1)2
 42 + 8 + 1 (a  c):
In Figure 4.4, the horizontal axis represents each rm's share owned by the domestic
residents. The vertical axis represents the subsidy rate. Under cross-country sharehold-
ing, the optimal subsidy denoted as sCi () is positive only when the domestic residents'
shareholding is very large. Under cross-rm shareholding, the optimal subsidy denoted as
sFi () is always nonnegative and larger than that under cross-country shareholding. The
optimal subsidy under mixed cross shareholding denoted as si (; ) lies between these
two curves. The three curves intersect at sBi when 1 = 2 = 1. Therefore, the higher
the foreign shareholding owned by the rival rm's shareholders, the stronger the country's
subsidization incentive.
67
Osubsidy rate
112
5
6
sFi ()
sCi ()
sBi
si (; )
Fig. 4.4: Optimal Subsidy under Symmetric Cost and Cross Shareholding Structure
4.5 Welfare Implication under Cross-Country vs. Cross-
Firm Shareholding
This section examines the national welfare and world welfare under both mutual share-
holding structures and discusses the subsidy competition eects. Here W1(= W2) denotes
the exporting country's welfare,W3 the importing country's welfare andWT the world wel-
fare. The cost structure and mutual shareholding structure is symmetric as c1 = c2 = c,
11 = 22 = . The results are summarized into the following table and gures.
Tab. 4.1: Results under Cross-Country vs. Cross-Firm Shareholding
Cross-Country Cross-Firm
Eq. Output xC(; 0) = 1
3
(a  c) > xF (; 0) = 
2+1
(a  c)
xC(; sC()) = 2
11 6 (a  c) < xF (; sF ()) = 2 42+8+1(a  c)
Ex. Country W C1 (; 0) =
1
9
(a  c)2 < W F1 (; 0) = (2+1)2 (a  c)2
W C1 (; s
C()) = 2(7 6)
(11 6)2 (a  c)2 > W F1 (; sF ()) = 2( 4
2+4+1)
( 42+8+1)2 (a  c)2
Im. Country W C3 (; 0) =
2(a c)2
9
> W F3 (; 0) =
22
(2+1)2
(a  c)2
W C3 (; s
C()) = 8
(11 6)2 (a  c)2 < W F3 (; sF ()) = 8
2
( 42+8+1)2 (a  c)2
World Welfare W CT (; 0) =
4(a c)2
9
> W FT (; 0) =
2(+1)
(2+1)2
(a  c)2
W CT (; s
C()) = 12(3 2)
(11 6)2 (a  c)2 < W FT (; sF ()) = 4( 4
2+6+1)
( 42+8+1)2 (a  c)2
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4.5.1 Exporting Country
Analyses for the exporting country welfare in Figure 4.5 yield the following results:
(1) In the case of cross-country shareholding without subsidy provision, each exporting
country's welfare is constant.
(2) In the other cases, an increase in the foreign shareholding ratio 1  improves each
exporting country's welfare.
(3) W F1 (; 0) > W
C
1 (; 0). Without subsidy competition, cross-rm shareholding im-
proves each exporting country's welfare. Since the exporting rms behave more collusively,
cross-rm shareholding benets the exporters' national welfare.
(4) W F1 (; s
F ()) < W C1 (; s
C()). With subsidy competition, cross-rm sharehold-
ing worsens each exporting country's welfare due to the higher subsidy payments.
Welfare

11/2
(a c)2
9
(a c)2
8
W C1 (; s
C())
W F1 (; s
F ())
W C1 (; 0)
W F1 (; 0)
2(a c)2
25
Fig. 4.5: Exporting Country's Welfare
4.5.2 Importing Country
Analyses for the importing country welfare in Figure 4.6 yield the following results:
(1) In the case of cross-country shareholding without subsidy provision, the importing
country's welfare is constant.
(2) In the other cases, an increase in the foreign shareholding ratio 1   deteriorates
the importing country's welfare.
(3) W F3 (; 0) < W
C
3 (; 0). Without subsidy competition, cross-rm shareholding
worsens the importing country due to the exporting rm's collusive behavior.
(4) W F3 (; s
F ()) > W C3 (; s
C()). With subsidy competition, cross-rm sharehold-
ing improves the importing country's welfare from the higher subsidy benets.
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25
W C3 (; s
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W F3 (; s
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W C3 (; 0)
W F3 (; 0)(a c)2
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Fig. 4.6: Importing Country's Welfare
4.5.3 World Welfare
Analyses for world welfare in Figure 4.7 yield the following results:
(1) In the case of cross-country shareholding without subsidy provision, world welfare
is constant.
(2) In the other cases, an increase in the foreign shareholding ratio (1  ) deteriorates
world welfare.
(3) W FT (; 0) < W
C
T (; 0). Without subsidy competition, cross-rm shareholding
makes world welfare worse o. Due to the collusively lower total output, cross-rm share-
holding structure should be banned or regulated as shown in the traditional industrial
organization theory.
(4)W FT (; s
F ()) > W CT (; s
C()). With governments' subsidy competition, the equi-
librium output under cross-rm shareholding is larger than that under cross-country share-
holding. Firms' collusion does not occur and world welfare is improved. Therefore, cross-
rm shareholding structure should not always be banned or regulated. With governments'
subsidy provision, cross-shareholding structure should be encouraged between exporting
rms.
Proposition 4.6. Without subsidy competition, cross-rm shareholding structure makes
world welfare worse o due to the collusive behavior of the exporting rms. However, with
subsidy competition, cross-rm shareholding structure leads to higher subsidy rates and
makes world welfare better o.
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Fig. 4.7: World Welfare
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examines how the market performances and strategic export subsidy incen-
tives are aected by the international mutual shareholding structures, especially under
cross-country and cross-rm shareholding structure. The new ndings can be summarized
as follows.
First, the market outcome is independent of the cross-country shareholding structure.
However, under the cross-rm shareholding, since the foreign rm's prots also constitute
a fraction of the rm's market value, each rm should take into account its output decision
on the foreign rm's prot. This suggests that cross-rm shareholding actually plays a
role in determining the output decisions of the rms and makes the rms behave more
collusively.
Second, this chapter claries that new sources of strategic subsidy incentives are dier-
ent from that in the standard export subsidy model without mutual shareholding. Addi-
tional subsidy incentive eects dampen the traditional rent extraction of export subsidiza-
tion and mitigate the subsidy competition between the two exporting countries.
Third, compared with cross-country shareholding, the cross-rm shareholding is more
likely to strengthen each government's subsidy incentive, and it also improves world welfare.
Hence, cross-rm shareholding should not always be regulated or banned with government
subsidization.
Finally, it would be interesting to examine how strategic subsidy incentives are aected
when cross shareholding structures (i; j) are endogenously determined and take into
account the timing of the game. Further, the model can be extended from an exporting
rm to a multinational rm with a subsidiary in the foreign country. When the subsidiary
is internationally owned, one can examine the export competition in the third country or
foreign country. These are the topics for future research.
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Appendix
4.A Optimal Subsidy under Cross-Country Sharehold-
ing
When 1 = 2 = 1, it is the BS model. The optimal subsidy rate is shown by
sCi (1) =
4i   j
15
> 0 if xCi > 0: (2-13)
Comparing with sCi (i; j) in (4-6) leads to
() = sCi (i; j)  sCi (1; 1)
/ 20(10i + 4j   6ij   7)i + 5(8i + 20j   12ij   17)j
  (33  20i   20j + 12ij)(4i   j)
= 8(35i + 20j   21ij   34)i + 4(5i + 20j   12ij   13)j:
Due to @()
@i
= 8(35 21j)i+4(5 12j)j > 8(35 21)i+4(5 12)j = 28(4i j) > 0,
it follows
(i; j) < (1; j) = 8(1  j)i + 4( 8 + 8j)j = 8(1  j)(i   4j) < 0;
in view of (2-13). Therefore, sCi () < s
C
i (1) is proved.
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4.B Second-Order Condition for Welfare Maximiza-
tion under Mixed Cross Shareholding
Using (4-25), the SOC for the welfare maximization can be examined as below.
@2W i (s;; )
@s2i
=  i[(1  i)i + (1  ijj)]@x

i
@si
@xj
@si
  (2  ii)@x

i
@si
=

 i[(1  i)i + (1  ijj)]
@xj
@si
  (2  ii)

@xi
@si
Since (4-18) yields
@xi
@si
> 0, the sign is determined by the value in the square bracket
dened as below.
A
def
=  i[(1  i)i + (1  ijj)]
@xj
@si
  (2  ii)
=
2(1  ij)(1  jj) + j(1  i)(4  2ii   2ijij)  i(1  j)(1  2j2j)
 4(1  ij)
=
j(1  i)(4  2ii   2ijij) + (1  jj)[(1  j)(2  i   ijj) + 2j(1  i)]
 4(1  ij) < 0
where use was made of (4-19) and i =
1 j
1 ij .
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4.C Subsidization Incentive under Cross-Country vs.
Cross-Firm Shareholding
Note i can be expressed as i =
1 j

and  = 1   ij. Then, the FOCs for welfare
maximization in both regimes yield
  @W
C
i
@si

si=0
= xi
 
(1  j)P 0(X)
@xCj
@si
  j(1  i)
!
+ i(1  j)xjP 0(X)@x
C
i
@si
;
  @W
F
i
@si

si=0
= xi
 
(1  j)P 0(X)
@xFj
@si
  j(1  i)
!
:
In view of  > 0, to assure
@W Ci
@si

si=0
 0,
xi
 
(1  j)P 0(X)
@xCj
@si
  j(1  i)
!
  i(1  j)xjP 0(X)@x
C
i
@si
> 0
should be satised. Thus, it follows
(1  j)P 0(X)
@xCj
@si
> j(1  i):
Substituting the above result into
@W Fi
@si

si=0
yields the following results.
  @W
F
i
@si

si=0
= xi
 
(1  j)P 0(X)
@xFj
@si
  j(1  i)
!
> xi
 
(1  j)P 0(X)
@xFj
@si
  (1  j)P 0(X)
@xCj
@si
!
= xi (1  j)P 0(X)
 

@xFj
@si
  @x
C
j
@si
!
= xi(1  j)

(1  ij)(1 + j)
3  i   j   ij  
1
3

= xi(1  j) Fi(i; j)
3(3  i   j   ij)
where Fi (i; j) := i + 4j   2ij   3i2j .
To prove Fi (i; j)  0, note that i := 1 ji 2 (0; 1) when i (i = 1; 2) runs over
 
1
2
; 1

.
Given i 2 (0; 1), Fi (i; j) is strictly concave in j given by
@Fi (i; j)
@j
=  2i   6ij + 4;
@2Fi (i; j)
@2j
=  6i < 0:
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Thus, Fi (i; j) = min fFi (i; 0) ; Fi (i; 1)g = min fi; 4 (1  i)g  0 must hold.
This establishes the desired result as below.
@W Ci
@si

si=0
 0 =) @W
F
i
@si

si=0
> 0;
which conveys the message that under cross-rm shareholding, the government has stronger
incentive to subsidize the own exports than under cross-country shareholding.
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Chapter 5
Separation of Ownership and
Management
5.1 Introduction
Over 70 years ago, Berle and Means (1932) rst argued that large corporations are charac-
terized by the separation of ownership and management. They criticized that rms' own
prot-maximization behavior is oversimplied in the traditional economic and industrial
organization theories. Based on Berle and Means (1932)'s argument, Baumol (1958) sug-
gested that rm managers may have certain objectives other than pure prot maximization
and assumed a sales maximization hypothesis. His work emphasized the behavioral the-
ory of the rm, and a number of economists examined dierent managerial objectives to
analyze rms' optimal behavior (See Simon (1964), Williamson (1964), etc.).
However, the above studies focused on the internal organization of the rm and re-
garded the rm as a simple monopolizer. When a greater number of rms compete in the
market, each rm's managerial objectives are determined by taking into consideration the
rival rms' behavior. A strategic managerial decision analysis in the oligopolistic market
was rst conducted by Vickers (1985) and stylized by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and
Sklivas (1987) (hereafter the FJS model). They considered a two-stage model where, in
the rst stage, prot-maximizing owners oer compensation schemes to their managers and
in the next stage, managers compete in quantities or prices under precommitted compen-
sation schemes. The FJS model claried managers' nonprot-maximizing behavior from
the game-theoretical point of view, indicating that delegating a manager with distorted
objective functions aects the strategic performance of the rm and induces it to act as a
Stackelberg-leader (or follower) in the quantity (or price) competition.
Managerial delegation attains the equivalent eect as the strategic subsidization shown
in the BS model. The rent-shifting eect of the strategic subsidization can also be explained
by the rms' distorted objective functions as a similar principal-agent model. Govern-
ment subsidization induces the rms to maximize the subsidy-inclusive prots and wins
a Stackelberg-leader position in the quantity competition, thus improving their own wel-
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fare. In that sense, government's export subsidy policy can be replaced by the owner's
managerial delegation in the oligopolistic competition.
Although Fershtman and Judd (1987) have pointed out the similarity between the BS
and FJS models, few studies have considered this view seriously. Recently, a number of
papers analyzed strategic managerial delegation involving international trade in a duopoly
market. Das (1997) applied an FJS-style delegation in both quantity and price settings
to the standard strategic trade policy models and showed that the magnitude of the op-
timal export subsidy or tax is smaller in the presence of managerial delegation in both
the quantity and price competition. Miller and Pazgal (2005), which is distinguished from
the analyses in Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986), introduced
the so-called { "Relative Performance" contract { a linear combination of own prot and
competitor's prot. Collie (1997) examined the domestic government's incentive to dele-
gate the trade policy to a policy-maker when two rms compete in the domestic market
and revealed that the domestic government should choose delegation so as to improve
both countries' welfares. However, the above research did not discuss the nature of the
equivalent strategic behavior between government's trade policy and owner's managerial
delegation under oligopolistic competition. In addition, they considered the two policies
as independent instruments and did not explore their total eects on the behavior of the
rms.
This chapter combines the BS and FJS models and reexamines Das (1997)'s study
by focusing on the owner's subsidy eect hidden in the managerial delegation process and
claried the result of oversubsidization of the rm with government intervention. Although
Das (1997) has already investigated such a strategic export subsidy model coupled with
managerial delegation, the study in this chapter is explicitly dierent from Das (1997).
First, my study focuses on the owner's subsidization incentives by designing a managerial
incentive contract. Das (1997) has indicated that the owner's delegation itself is a prot-
shifting mechanism, he did not clearly explain this mechanism. This chapter further shows
the equivalence result that the owner's delegation behavior has the same eect as govern-
ment subsidization on the own rm in the duopoly market. Second, my study discusses
how government intervention aects the owner's prot-shifting performance. Das (1997)
simply compared the magnitude of government subsidy in equilibrium with the BS model
and disregarded the role of the owner's rent-shifting performance in a strategic export sub-
sidy competition. This chapter claries that each owner's strategic subsidization incentive
is strengthened with government intervention if their own subsidy-inclusive marginal cost
is lower than the rival rm's marginal cost. Third, my study examines the total subsidy
eect summing up both government subsidization and owner's delegation behavior. Under
symmetric cost conditions, each exporting rm is over-subsidized in equilibrium and the
Cournot competition between the rms becomes more erce. Each exporting country's
welfare worses and world welfare improves.
This chapter elucidates how the traditional subsidization incentives studied in the BS
model are aected in the presence of separation of ownership and management. Although
managerial delegation can replace export subsidy policy to yield the same prot shifting
eect, the export competing governments still have incentives to subsidize the own rms.
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The study emphasizes the result in de Meza (1986), who showed that the more eective
country has stronger incentive to subsidize the rm. Government's positive subsidization
lies in that it makes the own rm more competitive and thereby strengthens the owner's
subsidization incentives to grab more rent from the foreign rm. Thus, in the presence
of separation of ownership and management in the duopoly market, export subsidy pol-
icy weakens its role as a rent-shifting instrument, but intensies its cost-reduction eect
to gain cost advantage. The study is a challenge to clarify the interdependent relation-
ship connecting government's policy decision with the organization of the rm. It shows
new implications on the traditional strategic trade policy related with modern corporate
structure.
Furthermore, this chapter investigates the unilateral delegation case and endogenizes
the owners' delegation decisions at the very rst stage. In the FJS model framework, when
letting the owners decide whether or not to hire a manager, Basu (1995) showed that a
Stackelberg equilibrium may be realized if the cost dierence between the rms is large
enough. White (2001) examined this issue in a mixed oligopoly and concluded that only pri-
vate rms hire managers. Constantine, Evangelos, and Emmanuel (2006) endogenized the
owner's choice between the two types of managerial incentive contracts: Prot-Revenues
contract (introduced in the FJS model) and Relative-Performance contracts (introduced in
Miller and Pazgal (2001, 2002)). The above research showed that prisoner's dilemma result
in the FJS model may not occur if the rm is able to arrive at the managerial delegation
decision. This chapter claries that when governments are involved, both owners have no
incentive to delegate a manager, and a Pareto-ecient result is realized in the symmetric
cost conditions.
The analysis in this chapter is based on Wei (2008). The remaining sections proceeds as
follows. Section 2 describes a three-stage government-owner-manager game and discusses
the role of owner's subsidy equivalent and total subsidy to the rms. Section 3 solves the
bilateral delegation model in owner's subsidy equivalent approach and reveals some new
results not discussed in Das (1997). Section 4 examines the unilateral delegation case and
Section 5 extends the model to add one more stage to endogenize the owners' delegation
decisions. Concluding remarks are summed up in section 6.
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5.2 Model Setup
Following the framework of the BS model, rm i's prot function is given by
i(x; si) = (P (X)  ci + si)xi: (2-1)
Each exporting rm has one owner and one manager. Each owner designs an incentive
contract to compensate its manager, which is expressed as a linear combination of the
rm's prot and revenue as in the FJS model.
M i(x; i; si) = i 
i(x; si) + (1  i)P (X)xi
= [P (X)  i(ci   si)]xi; (5-1)
where i denotes the contract term of rm i and is the weight on the rm's prot in the
contract. If i = 1, (5-1) is simply rm i's pure prot function. The rm faces a managerial
subsidy-inclusive cost of i(ci   si) in (5-1).
Note thatMi does not represent a manager's rewards in general. In fact, the manager is
paid Ai+BiMi for some constants Ai andBi withBi > 0. The owner must oer his manager
a contract under which the participation constraint is satised, i.e., Ai + BiMi = K such
that K equals the manager's reservation income or opportunity cost and is a constant.1
Without loss of generality, K is normalized to 0, i.e., Ai +BiMi = 0.
In view of the weighed-average combination of prot and sales in (5-1), the manager
is able to determine a more (or less) aggressive output, since unlike in the pure prot
maximization case, the manager faces the marginal cost of i(ci   si) in the incentive
contract. i(ci   si) is termed as rm i's managerial marginal cost. Each rm acts as
though it were subsidized (or taxed) by an amount equivalent to the cost dierence between
the actual marginal cost ci and the managerial marginal cost i(ci   si). I dene this cost
dierence as total subsidy (or tax) of rm i, Si:
2
Si := ci   i(ci   si):
Total subsidy (or tax) can be divided into two parts. One is government subsidy si set
at the rst stage, which is the cost dierence between government intervention and nonin-
tervention behavior. The other is nonpecuniary subsidy caused by the owner's manipulated
incentive contracts designed in the second stage, which is the cost dierence between the
owner's delegation and non-delegation behavior given a precommitted government subsi-
dization.3 The nonpecuniary subsidy is dened as owner's subsidy (or tax) equivalent of
rm i, di:
4
di := Si   si = (1  i)(ci   si):
1See Chapter 14 in Basu (1993).
2If Si < 0, the rm is taxed in total.
3With government subsidy commitment at the rst stage, the marginal cost is ci si without managerial
delegation and (1 i)(ci   si) with managerial delegation. I dene the cost dierence due to managerial
delegation as owner's subsidy (tax) equivalent.
4I regard di as the owner's subsidy equivalent if di > 0 or the owner's tax equivalent if di < 0.
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Owner's subsidy (or tax) equivalent appears to be a debatable concept since the owner
cannot subsidize (or tax) the rm itself. However, by manipulating an incentive contract,
the owner can divert the manager's objective from strict prot maximization to attain the
subsidization (or taxation) objective. Owing to the separation of ownership and manage-
ment, the rm faces a marginal cost that is reduced by di (or increased by  di) comparing
to the pure prot-maximization behavior. Hence, the owner's behavior of delegating a
manager with contract term i is equivalent to subsidizing the rm with a unit production
subsidy di (or taxing the rm with unit production tax  di).
This chapter explores a three-stage government-owner-manager game. In the rst stage,
each exporting country's government simultaneously determines the country-specic sub-
sidy rate to the own rm. In the second stage, given both the countries' subsidy rates,
each owner delegates a manager and decides his/her owner subsidy (or tax) equivalent di.
In the third stage, each manager { being aware of his incentive scheme and that of the rival
{ decides the production quantity to export to the third country competing a la Cournot.
Unlike Das (1997), my study lets each owner decide di instead of contract term i in the
second stage. Given that si is determined in the rst stage, di is a monotonic function of
i since ci si > 0.5 Although the model results in the same equilibrium values as those in
Das (1997), the owner's subsidy equivalent approach claries the total eects on the rms'
outputs and social welfare in the proceeding analysis.
(5-1) can be rewritten as follows:
fM i(x; Si) = [P (X)  ci + Si]xi; (5-2)
where Si = di + si. The game is solved by backward induction from the third stage.
5I do not consider the case ci   si  0 when ci is very small.
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5.3 Model Solution
5.3.1 Output Stage Equilibrium
After observing each country's government subsidy rate and each rm's incentive contract,
the managers decide their optimal outputs under the precommitted contract in (5-2). Given
that the SOC is satised,6 the FOC for maximizing (5-2) with respect to its own output
yields
0 =
@fM i(x; Si)
@xi
=MRi   (ci   Si); (5-3)
where MRi = P (X) + xiP
0(X) denotes the marginal revenue of rm i. Given its rival's
output, each rm's manager ascertains the best response obtained by equating the marginal
revenue with the marginal cost net of total subsidy, i.e., MRi = ci   Si.
Dene riD(xj; Si) as manager i's reaction function and the superscript D denotes the
equilibrium values under managerial delegation.
riD(xj; Si) = argmax
xi
fM i(x; Si) = 1
2
(a  xj   ci + Si): (5-4)
Thus, riDx
def
=
@ri(xj ;Si)
@xj
=  1
2
< 0 shows that each rm's optimal output is a strategic
substitute to the other's and riDS
def
=
@ri(xj ;Si)
@Si
= 1
2
> 0.
Solving for each rm's optimal output at the third-stage equilibrium yields
xDi (S) =
1
3
[i + 2Si   Sj]; (5-5)
where S = (Si; Sj) represents the total subsidy prole and i = a 2ci+cj(i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i).
Note that each rm's equilibrium output depends on the total subsidies of both rms.
Dierentiating (5-5) with Si yields:
@xDi (S)
@di
=
@xDi (S)
@Si
=
2
3
> 0 ;
@xDj (S)
@di
=
@xDj (S)
@Si
= rjDx
@xDi (S)
@Si
=  1
3
< 0:
(5-6)
An increase in the domestic owner's subsidy reduces the domestic marginal cost and in-
duces the domestic manager to act more aggressively under Cournot competition. Hence,
the domestic rm's output increases and foreign rm's output decreases as a strategic
substitute.
6It is easily veried that:
@2fM i(x; Si)
@x2i
=  2 < 0:
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5.3.2 Contract Stage Equilibrium
BS Subsidy Equivalence Result
Without government intervention, the nonintervention two-staged owner-manager model
is the FJS model. The optimal owner's subsidy equivalent in the FJS model is identical to
a la Brander-Spencer government subsidy, i.e.,
dFJi =
0i
5
= sBi ;
where the superscripts FJ denotes the equilibrium values in the FJS model and 0i :=
a  3ci + 2cj(i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i) > 0 due to the positive equilibrium output in (5-7) below.
The resulting equilibrium output and national welfare also yield the equivalence results
in view of (2-25) and (2-26).
x^FJi =
20i
5
= x^Bi (5-7)
cW FJi = 202i25 = cWBi (5-8)
Proposition 5.1. In the absence of government intervention, strategic managerial dele-
gation induces each rm to act as though it were subsidized with an optimal government
subsidy in the BS model, i.e., dFJi = s
B
i and x^
FJ
i = x^
B
i (i = 1; 2).
The above result also holds true under a general demand function when each rm's
product is a strategic substitute to that of the other. The BS and FJS models can be
regarded as similar principal-agent models, in which agents play Nash against all others,
and principals play Stackelberg against agents and Nash against all other principals. In
the BS model, the governments' precommitments to pay an export subsidy distort rms'
incentives to advance the own national welfare. Similarly, in the FJS model, owners' strate-
gic managerial delegation also distorts managers' incentives to achieve higher prots. Note
that the objective functions in both the models are the same, i.e., since principals maxi-
mize the own rm's subsidy-exclusive prot functions and agents maximize the own rm's
subsidy-inclusive prot functions. Thus, under the same duopolistic market performance,
owner's optimal nonintervention subsidy equivalent in the FJS model is equivalent to the
government's optimal subsidy in the BS model.
Owner's Subsidy Equivalent in the Second-Stage Equilibrium
In the second stage, each rm's owner decides di in the incentive contract to maximize its
own prot. Since the cost of delegating a manager is assumed to zero, i.e., Ai+BiMi = 0,
the owner acts as a pure prot maximizer. Evaluating the equilibrium output in (5-5)
yields the following expression for each rm's prot function:
Di (d; s) = 
i
 
xDi (d+ s); x
D
j (d+ s); si

=
1
9
[a  (2ci + Si) + (cj   Sj) + 3si] [a  2(ci   Si) + (cj   Sj)] :
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Given the SOC is satised,7 the FOC for maximizing the prot function is given by
0 =
@Di (d; s)
@di
=
@i
@xi
@xDi
@di
+
@i
@xj
@xDj
@di
= (MRi   ci + si) @x
D
i
@di
+ xiP
0(X)
@xDj
@di
: (5-9)
The rst term in (5-9) represents the marginal prot-loss through the excess competition
eect. An increase in the domestic rm's production results in a further decrease in the
marginal revenue as compared to the subsidy-inclusive marginal cost. Hence, the own
output expansion leads to a domestic prot loss. The second term in (5-9) represents the
marginal prot gain through the rent-shifting eect, which shows that a decrease in the
foreign rm's output improves the terms of trade and thus shifts the rent from the foreign
rm to the domestic rm.
Denote iD(dj; s) as owner i's reaction function to maximize its own prot:
iD(dj; s) := argmax
di
Di (d; s) =
1
4
(i + 2si   sj   dj):
Although the properties of the above reaction function can be easily derived in the
linear demand function, I provide an intuitive explanation in view of (5-9).
Owner i's reaction curve is depicted as ii0(i = 1; 2) in Figure 5.2. Each rm's reaction
curve is downward sloping, which is given by
@iD(dj; s)
@dj
/ @
2Di (d; s)
@dj@di
=
@MRi
@dj
@xDi
@di
+
@(xiP
0(X))
@dj
@xDj
@di
= 0  @x
D
i
@Sj
@xDj
@di
< 0:
In view of (5-9), an increase in the rival rm's owner's subsidy equivalent does not aect
the excess competition eect since the manager always equates its marginal revenue to the
marginal cost exclusive of the total subsidy. However, its terms of trade deteriorates due to
an increase in the rival rm's output, and the rent-shifting eect becomes weaker. Hence,
each rm's owner's subsidy equivalent is a strategic substitute to that of the rival. The
above result also claries that an increase in the rival country's government subsidy shifts
the reaction curve inward as below:
@iD(dj; s)
@sj
=
@iD(dj; s)
@dj
< 0:
7The SOC can be derived as follows:
@2Di (d; s)
@d2i
=  4
9
< 0:
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Meanwhile, an increase in the own government's subsidy shifts the reaction curve outward:
@iD(dj; s)
@si
/ @
2Di (d; s)
@si@di
=

@MRi
@si
  1

@xDi
@Si
+
@(xiP
0(X))
@si
@xDj
@Si
= 0  @x
D
i
@Si
@xDj
@Si
< 0:
An increase in the own government subsidy does not aect the excess competition eect.
However, it strengthens the rent-shifting eect; this is because the rival rm's output
contracts further and improves the terms of trade, thus shifting the reaction curve outward.
The intersection of the two reaction curves labeled B in Figure 5.2 represents the
optimal owner's subsidy equivalent of rm i in the second-stage equilibrium, deDi (s) which
is given by
deDi (s) = xiP
0(X)rjDx =
0i + 3si   2sj
5
; (5-10)
where the superscript e represents the delegation stage equilibrium values. Without gov-
ernment intervention, Point B shows the equilibrium subsidies in the BS model, or the
equilibrium owner's subsidy equivalent in the FJS model, i.e., dFJi = d
eD
i (0) = s
B
i .
The comparative static results yield:
@deDi (s)
@si
=
3
5
> 0 ;
@deDj (s)
@si
=  2
5
< 0:
An increase in the domestic government subsidy makes the domestic rm more ecient
than the rival rm due to the reduction in marginal cost. Thus, the domestic owner has a
stronger subsidization incentive as indicated by de Meza (1986). Meanwhile, the rival rm
becomes less ecient and its owner's subsidization incentive weakens.
Equilibrium Output Change
The resulting second-stage equilibrium output is given by
xeDi (s) : = x
D
i
 
deDi (s) + si; d
eD
j (s) + sj

(5-11)
=
2
5
[0i + 3si   2sj]
Dierentiating rm i's equilibrium output xeDi (s) with respect to si yields
0 <
@xeDi
@si
=
@xDi
@Si
+
@xDi
@Si
@deDi
@si
+
@xDi
@Sj
@deDj
@si
:
An increase in the domestic government subsidy aects the domestic equilibrium output in
three ways: (1) it reduces the domestic marginal cost; (2) strengthens the domestic owner's
subsidization incentive; and (3) weakens the foreign owner's subsidization incentive. Since
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the three eects work in the same direction, the overall eect is reinforced, and the domestic
rm acts more aggressively than it does without government intervention.
Likewise, the foreign rm's equilibrium output is aected in the same three ways.
0 >
@xeDj
@si
=
@xDj
@Si
+
@xDj
@Si
@deDi
@si
+
@xDj
@Sj
@deDj
@si
= rjDx
@xeDi (s)
@si
+D
@xDj
@Sj
@deDj
@si
: (5-12)
Using (5-6), (5-11) and D = 1  riDx rjDx > 0, foreign output change can be rewritten into
two parts as shown in (5-12). The rst part represents the foreign rm's output decrease
as a strategic substitute to the domestic output, and the second part represents the foreign
rm's excess output decrease due to strategic managerial delegation competition between
the owners. Note that the second part does not hold true when the foreign owner does not
compete to delegate a manager.
Equilibrium Prot Change
Note that xeDi (s) = r
iD(xeDj (s); S
eD
i (s)) where S
eD
i (s) = si + d
eD
i (s), then equilibrium
output change can be rewritten as follows.
@xeDi (s)
@si
= riDx
@xeDj (s)
@si
+ riDS
@SeDi
@si
(5-13)
@xeDj (s)
@si
= rjDx
@xeDi (s)
@si
+ rjDS
@SeDj
@si
(5-14)
Each rm's prot function can be rewritten as eDi (s) = i(x
eD
i (s); x
eD
j (s); si). Dier-
entiating eDi (s) with si yields
@eDi (s)
@si
=
@i
@xi
@xeDi
@si
+
@i
@xj
@xeDj
@si
+
@i
@si
=  di@x
eD
i
@si
+ xiP
0(X)
@xeDj
@si
+ xi (5-15)
= xiP
0(X)rjDS
@SeDj
@si
+ xi > 0; (5-16)
@eDj (s)
@si
=
@j
@xj
@xeDj
@si
+
@j
@xi
@xeDi
@si
=  dj
@xeDj
@si
+ xjP
0(X)
@xeDi
@si
= xjP
0(X)riDS
@SeDi
@si
< 0: (5-17)
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where use was made of (5-3), (5-13) and (5-14). With managerial delegation, government
subsidization increases domestic rm's prot and reduces the rival rm's prot. The rent-
shifting eect of strategic subsidization is not dampened in the presence of separation of
ownership and management.
5.3.3 Subsidy Stage Equilibrium
Government Subsidy in Equilibrium
Each country's welfare function is expressed by the product surplus less the subsidy pay-
ment.
W eDi (s) = 
eD
i (s)  sixeDi (s)
=
2
25
(0i   2si   2sj) (0i + 3si   2sj)
Given that the SOC is satised,8 the FOC for welfare maximization is solved as follows.
0 =
@W eDi (s)
@si
=
@eDi
@si
  xi   si@x
eD
i
@si
(5-18)
= xiP
0(X)
 
riDS
@SeDj
@si
!
  si@x
eD
i
@si
; (5-19)
where (5-16) was used. The parenthetical term in (5-19) represents the foreign rm's excess
output decreases due to the strategic managerial delegation competition shown by the
second part in (5-14). This term times ( P 0) represents the price rise and times domestic
output xi represents the domestic marginal revenue increase caused by the improved terms
of trade. Given any sj, a small subsidy benets the own country as shown by
@W eDi (s)
@si

si=0
= xiP
0(X)riDS
@SeDj
@si
> 0:
Lemma 5.1. When both exporting rms strategically delegate a manager, both governments
have positive incentives to subsidize the own rms.
Each country's reaction function is derived as below.
RiD(sj) =
1
12
(0i   2sj)
8Again, the SOC is easily veried:
@2W eDi (s)
(@si)2
=  24
25
< 0:
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Denote sDi as the equilibrium government's subsidy of country i. Calculation under
linear demand function yields
sDi =
a  4ci + 3cj
14
=

00
i
14
> 0: (5-20)
where 
00
i = a   4ci + 3cj(i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i) > 0. The positive sign is assured by the
duopolistic output in the equilibrium, i.e.,
x^Di = x
eD
i (s
D) =
3
00
i
7
: (5-21)
Since the rms are subsidized by the owners in the second-stage equilibrium, there may
be a doubt as to why the governments do not tax the rms to reduce welfare distortion in
the rst-stage equilibrium. The paradox is resolved by noting that only the rent-shifting
eect induces a shift in each owner's reaction curve shown in the previous subsection.
Taxation increases the marginal cost, owing to which domestic owner has less incentive
to subsidize the rm. The prot of the domestic rm decreases and the rent shifts to the
foreign rms, thus deteriorating the domestic country's welfare. Although each rm's owner
subsidizes the rm through manipulating the separation of ownership and management,
each country's government still has a positive incentive to subsidize the own rm to prevent
rent outow.
In view of (5-20), it is shown that the optimal government subsidy is denitely lower
than the subsidy a la Brander-Spencer under the asymmetric cost conditions, i.e.,9
sDi   sBi =

00
i
14
  
0
i
5
=  2
0
i + 4
00
i + 3(a  cj)
70
< 0;
where (5-7) and (5-21) were used.
Lemma 5.2. Strategic managerial delegation competition suppresses both governments'
subsidization incentives, i.e., sDi < s
B
i (i = 1; 2).
The intuition behind can be explained as below. In the absence of government inter-
vention, each owner manipulates the incentive scheme to grant the rm a subsidy a la
Brander-Spencer. However, when the governments are involved, each country's govern-
ment subsidization strengthens the domestic owner's subsidization incentive and weakens
that of the foreign owner. The quantity competition between the exporting rms becomes
more ercer, which deteriorates the terms of trade and worsens the welfare of the exporting
countries. Therefore, each country's government has a weaker incentive to subsidize the
own rm.
Comparing the magnitude of government subsidy in equilibrium is not enough in our
analysis. In view of (5-5), the rms' outputs, as well as social welfare10 are dependent
9Das (1997) does not show this result explicitly.
10The welfare function can be rewritten as:
W Di (S) = (P (X
D(S))  ci)xDi (S):
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on the total subsidies of both rms. Therefore, I proceed to examine the owner's subsidy
equivalent and total subsidy in equilibrium.
Owner's Subsidy Equivalent in Equilibrium
The owner's subsidy equivalent in equilibrium can be rewritten as:
d^Di = d
eD
i (s
D) =
3
00
i
14
: (5-22)
Comparing the owner's subsidy equivalent d^Di to the subsidy a la Brander-Spencer s
B
i
yields
d^Di   sBi =
a  18ci + 17cj
70
:
Evidently, d^Di > s
B
i under the symmetric cost function. However, under the asymmetric
cost function, I nd that
d^Di T sBi () sDi T ci   cj:
Note that if the foreign rm is not as ecient as the domestic rm, i.e., ci  cj, d^Di is
always larger than sBi due to the positive value of s
D
i shown in (5-20). Then, consider the
case wherein the foreign rm is more ecient than the domestic rm, i.e., ci > cj. The
above condition can be rewritten as follows:
d^Di T sBi () ci   sDi S cj:
It is shown that if the domestic rm's subsidy-inclusive marginal cost is lower than the
foreign rm's marginal cost, the domestic owner's subsidy equivalent in equilibrium is
higher than the subsidy a la Brander-Spencer and vice versa. The intuition can be shown
by the result in de Meza (1986). When the strategic government subsidization makes
the domestic rm more ecient than the foreign rm, the domestic owner has a stronger
subsidization incentive than it does without government intervention.
Proposition 5.2. Each rm's equilibrium owner's subsidy equivalent is higher than the
subsidy a la Brander-Spencer if and only if its government-subsidy-inclusive marginal cost
is lower than the rival rm's marginal cost.
Total Subsidy In Equilibrium
Using (5-15), (5-18) can be rewritten as below.
0 =
@W eDi (s)
@si
=  di@x
eD
i
@si
+ xiP
0(X)
@xeDj
@si
  si@x
eD
i
@si
=  Si@x
eD
i
@si
+ xiP
0(X)
@xeDj
@si
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Solving for total subsidy in the above equation yields
S^Di = xiP
0(X)
@xeDj
@si
.@xeDi
@si
=
2
00
i
7
> 0:
Comparing total subsidy with the subsidy a la Brander-Spencer yields11
S^Di T sBi () sDi T
1
6
(ci   cj):
Note that only if the domestic rm is not considerably less ecient than the foreign rm
does sDi > s
B
i hold. However, if the analysis is conned under the symmetric cost con-
ditions, each rm owner's subsidy and total subsidy in equilibrium is higher than the
subsidy a la Brander-Spencer. In other words, strategic subsidy competition between the
exporting countries strengthens both rms' owner's subsidization incentives and leads to
oversubsidization to the rms.
Welfare in Equilibrium
Country i's welfare in equilibrium is given by:
cWDi =W eDi (sD) = 349 002i ;
which is lower than the welfare in the BS model shown in (5-8) when the cost conditions
are symmetric, i.e., cWDi < cWBi . However, the third country is at an advantage due to an
improvement in the importing country's terms of trade. Further, world welfare improves
as well, i.e.,
P3
i=1
cWDi >P3i=1cWBi .
Proposition 5.3. Under strategic managerial delegation and export subsidy competition,
each exporting country's welfare worsens in comparison to the BS model due to excess
subsidization in the symmetric cost conditions. However, the third country benets from
an improvement in the terms of trade and world welfare improves.
11It is given by
S^Di   sBi =
3a  19ci + 16cj
35
=
6
5

sDi  
1
6
(ci   cj)

:
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5.4 Unilateral Manager Delegation
Next, consider the unilateral manager delegation case in which only rm 1's owner delegates
a manager. In the third stage, rm 1's manager decides the output under the precommit-
ted contract, while rm 2's owner decides the output as a pure prot maximizer. The
equilibrium output in (5-5) is modied as S1 = d1 + s1 and S2 = s2.
In the second stage, only rm 1's owner delegates a manager. The equilibrium owner's
subsidy equivalent is
deU11 (s) =
1 + 2s1   s2
4
;
where the superscript U1 denotes the equilibrium when only rm 1 delegates a manager.
As for the equilibrium output change, the second part in (5-12) does not hold true.
@xeU12
@s1
= r2Dx
@xeU11
@s1
:
By substituting the above equations into (5-18), the FOC for country 1 can be derived
as below.
0 =
@W eU11 (s)
@s1
= s1
@xeU11
@s1
It is shown that country 1's equilibrium subsidy sU11 = 0. Country 1, which has a rm
following separation of ownership and management, has no incentive to subsidize its ex-
ports. The reason can be shown in Figure 1. Firm 1's reaction curve is sloping downward
as 110. Since d2 = 0, rm 1's owner decides the optimal subsidy at the intersection of the
reaction curve and horizontal axis. Government subsidy (or tax) will shift rm 1's reaction
curve outward (or inward) and lead to lower subsidy-exclusive prot (or national welfare).
Hence, country 1's government has no incentive to intervene.
As for country 2, since @2
@x2
= 0, the FOC of (5-18) satises
0 =
@W eU12 (s)
@s2
= x2P
0(X)
@xeU11
@s2
  s2@x
eU1
2
@s2
:
Country 2's equilibrium subsidy can be derived as
sU12 = x2P
0(X)
@xeU11
@s2
.@xeU12
@s2
=
02
3
= S^U12 > S^
D
2 ;
which has the same form as the total subsidy SD2 , but results in a larger value in equilib-
rium.12 Country 2, which has no rm following separation of ownership and management,
has stronger incentive to subsidize its exports.
12It is shown as
S^U12   S^D2 =
02
3
  2
00
2
7
=

00
1
21
> 0:
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d2
d1
s1 > 0
de1
1
Firm 1's isoprot
10
Fig. 5.1: Unilateral Manager Delegation
Country 2's government subsidy weakens rm 1's owner subsidization incentive. Solving
for rm 1's owner's subsidy equivalent in equilibrium yields
d^U11 = d
eD
1 (0; s
U1
2 ) =

00
1
6
= S^U11 :
In the absence of government intervention, the Stackelberg equilibrium in managerial
delegation yields
dLi
def
= argmax
di
i (di; 
j(di);0);
dFj
def
= j(dLi ); (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i):
It is shown that sU12 = d
L
2 and d^
U1
1 = d
F
1 . When only rm 1 delegates a manager, coun-
try 1's government has no incentive to subsidize, while country 2's government strengthens
its subsidization incentive, playing as a Stackelberg leader to rm 1's owner in the sub-
sidy competition. Hence, rm 1's unilateral delegation puts itself at a disadvantage as a
Stackelberg follower. Since total subsidy of each rm is just the Stackelberg leader-follower
subsidy, the equilibrium outputs also yield Stackelberg solution.
Proposition 5.4. Unilateral manager delegation entails free trade equilibrium in the coun-
try with the managerial rm. Meanwhile, the rival country's government strengthens the
subsidization incentive, playing as a Stackelberg leader to the managerial rm in the subsidy
competition.
Equilibrium total subsidies under bilateral and unilateral delegation can be summarized
into Figure 5.2. Point B, the intersection of 110 and 220, represents the equilibrium
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when no rm delegates a manager, the BS model13. Point Ui(i = 1; 2) represents the equi-
librium when only rm i delegates a manager. It is characterized by the tangency of rm
j(j 6= i)'s isoprot curve to rm i's reaction curve, that is, the Stackelberg equilibrium
point when rm j behaves as a leader. Point D represents the bilateral delegation equi-
librium in that both countries' governments play as Stackelberg leaders to the rival rm's
owner.
d2; S2
d1; S1
1
20
sB1 s
U2
1
d^U22
sB2
B
D
U2
Firm 1's IsoProt Curve
10
2
d^U11 S^D1
S^D2
sU12
Firm 2's IsoProt Curve
U1
Fig. 5.2: Equilibrium Total Subsidies in Bilateral and Unilateral Managerial Delegation
13The equilibrium government subsidy in the BS model is equivalent to the equilibrium owner's subsidy
equivalent in the FJS model.
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5.5 Managerial Delegation Game
The FJS model ends up in a prisoner's dilemma in the symmetric cost condition. When
endogenizing owners' delegation decisions, Basu (1995) discussed that unilateral delegation
equilibrium maybe dependent on the rms' cost dierence and delegation costs. However,
in our model wherein governments play Stackelberg against owners, the owners' manage-
rial delegation eects on the rms' behavior are dampened by government intervention.
Unilateral managerial delegation pushes the rival country to achieve Stackelberg advantage
and damage its own prot. To examine the owners' delegation incentives, I add one more
stage to let both owners decide whether or not to delegate a manager at the zero stage.
The game can be divided into four subgames, and the rms' payos in each subgame are
shown as below in the symmetric cost case.
Tab. 5.1: Payo Matrix in the Delegation Game
Firm 1
Firm 2
Delegation Non-delegation
Delegation 9
98
(a  c)2; 9
98
(a  c)2 1
18
(a  c)2; 1
4
(a  c)2
Non-delegation 1
4
(a  c)2; 1
18
(a  c)2 4
25
(a  c)2; 4
25
(a  c)2
It is shown that ^Uji > ^
B
i > ^
D
i > ^
Ui
i (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i). In the equilibrium, both rms
do not delegate a manager, and the Pareto-ecient equilibrium is realized. Therefore, when
both governments commit to intervene, both owners do not choose to delegate a manager
followed by government subsidization, since unilateral delegation leads to Stackelberg-
follower payo.
Proposition 5.5. In the government-owner-manager game, each rm has no incentive to
delegate a manager, and the Pareto-ecient equilibrium can be realized.
The above Proposition is based on the analyses in the previous sections. Given govern-
ment intervention, the managerial delegation competition leads to the oversubsidization
and lowers the rms' prots; however, unilateral delegation makes the domestic country
lose subsidization incentive and strengthens the rival country's subsidization incentive.
Thus, when the owners determine whether they should delegate a manager or not before
government interventions, no rm has incentive to delegate.
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5.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter reexamines the strategic export subsidy competition with the separation of
ownership and management in a third market model. I explore the owners' subsidization
incentives in designing a managerial incentive contract and discuss the total subsidy ef-
fect on the rms' performance in the market. Although the model is constructed in the
same way as that of Das (1997), this chapter conveys some new implications that are not
claried in Das (1997). The essence in Das (1997) is that both the rms are subsidized
with a smaller government subsidy as compared to the case without delegation. However,
this result cannot explain the change in the rm's output and social welfare since lower
government subsidy merely lowers the total output and increases the monopoly rent in the
exporting country, while the model ends up in a contradictory result. The rather paradox-
ical result can be explained by the total subsidy dened in my model. I show that rms
are subsidized in a larger total subsidy, and both rms overproduce in equilibrium. The
nature of strategic managerial delegation in the export subsidy competition lies in the fact
that it intensies the competition between the exporting rms and reduces the distortions
in oligopoly pricing, thus improving world welfare. This is the main point that my model
has emphasized dierently from Das (1997).
This chapter also recognizes owner's subsidization incentive through managerial del-
egation. Indicating the equivalence result between the FJS model and the BS model, I
regard owners' managerial delegation as subsidization behavior. It elucidates the result in
Das (1997) as to why the governments weaken the subsidization incentives in the presence
of managerial delegation. It also claries the Stackelberg solution in the unilateral delega-
tion case, which resulted in the government playing Stackelberg against the owner in the
subsidy competition.
The extension of delegation game shows that no rm has incentive to delegate under
governments' commitments to intervene. However, the results are largely dependent on
the order of the moves. If rm owners move rst and the governments subsequently, the
total subsidy in equilibrium is a subsidy a la Brander-Spencer. This is because the govern-
ments always determine the optimal subsidy rates to maximize the total subsidy exclusive
prot of the national rm. Irrelevant of rm owners' subsidy rates, the governments al-
ways decide the total subsidy rate to a la Brander-Spencer subsidy. Bearing in mind this
subsidization behavior, the rm owners actually choose to delegate and greatly tax the
rms to induce higher government subsidy. The analysis that the owners move as leaders
against governments is somewhat dicult and is left for future research.
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Appendix
5.A Price Competition
Wei (2009a) examined the strategic trade policy and managerial delegation under Bertrand
competition. The model is constructed in the framework of Eaton and Grossman (1986),
a price competition version of the BS model.
Each rm produces a dierentiated good. The demand function of good i is given by
xi(p) = a  pi + bpj (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i);
where a > 0 and 0 < b < 1.
To simplify the analysis, the cost conditions are symmetric, i.e., ci = cj = c. Each
rm's prot function is given by
i(p; ti) = (pi   c+ ti)xi(p):
Both exporting countries' governments tax their exports at a special tax of ti. Under
price competition, rms' managerial delegations yield owner's tax equivalent denoted as
i.
i := (i   1)(ci + ti):
Total tax Ti is dened as a sum of government tax and owner's tax equivalent.
Ti := ti + i = i(ci + ti)  ci
Price Stage Equilibrium The equilibrium price of good i in the third-stage is given by
pi (T) =
a(2 + b) + 2(ci + Ti) + b(cj + Tj)
4  b2 :
The equilibrium output can be derived as below.
xi (T) =
(2 + b)a  (2  b2)(ci + Ti) + b(cj + Tj)
4  b2 :
Taxation lowers domestic production and expands foreign production.
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Contract Stage Equilibrium Without government intervention, the model is the FJS
model. The equilibrium owner's tax equivalent is identical to the optimal government tax
in Eaton and Grossman (1986).
FJi =
b2
2
(pi   ci) = tEGi (i = 1; 2);
where superscript EG represents the equilibrium values in Eaton and Grossman (1986).
With government intervention, rm i's reaction function is given by
i(j; t) =
b2[(2 + b)a  (2  b2)(ci + ti) + b(cj + j + tj)]
4(2  b2) ;
which shows that @
i(:)
@j
= @
i(:)
@tj
> 0 and @
i(:)
@ti
< 0. Each rm's owner subsidy equivalent is
a strategic complementary to the rival's. Government's taxation weakens domestic rm's
owner taxation incentive and strengthens foreign rm's owner taxation incentive.
Denote
Zi(t) : = (4 + 2b  b2)a  (4  3b2)(ci + ti) + b(2  b2)(cj + tj);
Y : = (4 + 2b  b2)(4  2b  b2) = 16  12b2 + b4 > 0:
The optimal owner's tax equivalent of rm i is
 ei (t) =
b2Zi(t)
Y
> 0 (i = 1; 2):
The positive taxation incentive is assured by the duopoly equilibrium given by
xei (t) = x

i (
e
i (t) + ti; 
e
j (t) + tj) =
(2  b2)Zi(t)
Y
:
It is evident to show that
@ei (t)
@ti
< 0 and
@ej (t)
@ti
> 0. Government taxation reduces domestic
rm's owner tax equivalent and increases foreign rm's tax equivalent in the equilibrium.
In the quantity competition discussed in Section 5.3, since government subsidization raises
domestic rm's subsidy equivalent, government intervention policy seem as a complement
to managerial delegation. However, in the price competition, government intervention
policy acts as a substitution to managerial delegation.
Tax Stage Equilibrium Each country's welfare function is given by
W ei (t) = i(p
e
i (t); p
e
j(t); ti) + tix
e
i (t):
Optimal government tax yields
t^i =
b4C
(2  b2)D > 0;
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where C := a  (1  b)c > 0 and D := 8  4b  4b2 + b3 > 0. Although each rm's owner
taxes its exports, each government further has incentives to tax the exports, pushing the
domestic rm to yield Stackelberg leader's prot.
Comparing t^i with t
EG
i yields
t^i   tEGi =  
b2(1  b)(2 + b)(8  6b2 + b3)C
(2  b2)(4  2b  b2)D < 0:
That is, each country's government taxes in a lower rate in the presence of managerial
delegation.
Equilibrium owner's tax equivalent can be derived as below.
^i = 
e
i (^t) =
b2(4  3b2)C
(2  b2)D > 0:
Simple calculation yields ^i < t
EG
i = 
FJ
i . Equilibrium owner's subsidy equivalent also
results in a lower value with government intervention.
However, total tax is larger than tEGi shown as below.
T^i   tEGi = ^i + t^i   tEGi =
b4(2  b)C
(4  2b  b2)D > 0:
Each country's equilibrium welfare is given by
cWi = W ei (t^) = (4  b2)(4  3b2)C2D2 :
Comparing with the equilibrium welfare without managerial delegation in Eaton and
Grossman (1986) yields
cWi  WEGi = b5(16  16b  4b2 + 5b3)C2(4  2b  b2)2D2 > 0:
In the presence of separation of ownership and management, each good's price rises up due
to a larger total tax. The two rms behave close to a monopolistic rm. The exporting
countries' welfare improves and the third country is in a welfare loss. Thus, with govern-
ment intervention, managerial delegation in the price competition increases distortions in
the oligopoly competition and worsens world welfare.
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Chapter 6
International Separation of
Ownership and Management
6.1 Introduction
Chapters 4 and 5 concern the ownership and management structures of the rms. To the
best of my knowledge, no paper has examined the traditional strategic export policies in
the presence of both international cross shareholding and separation of ownership and man-
agement. This chapter combines the analyses in the previous two chapters and discusses
how the strategic subsidization incentives are aected by managerial delegation when the
shares of the rms are internationally owned by the residents of both countries, i.e., in
the presence of international separation of ownership and management. This chapter at-
tempts to study how the complexity of managerial decision process and cross shareholding
structure alter the standard welfare implication of strategic export promotion policies.
The works related to this chapter is summarized in the following table.
Tab. 6.1: Literature Summary
Subsidy Delegation Shareholding
Brander and Spencer (1985) ○ × ×
Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987) × ○ ×
Reynolds and Snapp (1986), Malueg (1992) × × ○
Das (1997), Wei (2008) ○ ○ ×
Macho-Stadler and Verdier (1991) × ○ ○
Dick (1993), Wei and Kiyono (2005) ○ × ○
Wei (2009b) ○ ○ ○
The analysis in this chapter is based on Wei (2009b). The rest of this chapter is
organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the equilibrium subsidy rate in the presence of
both cross shareholding and separation of ownership and management. Sections 3 and 4
discuss the eects of cross shareholding and managerial delegation on the strategic subsidy
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decisions, respectively. Section 5 compares the equilibrium results and their values in
Chapters 4 and 5. Section 6 shows two special cases of symmetric and partial ownership
structures. The concluding remarks are summed in section 7.
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6.2 Subsidy Stage Equilibrium
The timing of the game is the same as that of the three-stage game of Das (1997). In
this chapter, I only consider the international cross-country shareholding, i.e., the shares
of both rms are internationally owned by the residents of both countries. Although
shareholders are from dierent nations, shareholder unanimity on managerial delegation
to maximize its holding rm's prot is assumed to be satised. Hence, the output and
contract stage equilibria are the same as in the previous chapter. I solve the game in the
rst stage in which the governments decide the optimal subsidy rates. As in Chapter 4, i
denotes the percentage share of rm's i(i = 1; 2) equities owned by domestic residents and
is exogenously given.
Evaluating at the equilibrium in (5-11) and (5-16), each country's welfare function is
expressed by:
WEi (s;) = i
eD
i (s) + (1  j)eDj (s)  sixeDi (s):
Each government maximizes its national welfare by choosing the optimal export subsidy,
taking into account the response of both rms. The FOC for welfare maximization should
satisfy:1
@WEi (s;)
@si
= i
@eDi (s)
@si
+ (1  j)
@eDj (s)
@si
  xi   si@x
eD
i
@si
= i
 
xiP
0(X)rjDS
@SeDj
@si
+ xi
!
+ (1  j)

xjP
0(X)riDS
@SeDi
@si

  xi   si@x
eD
i
@si
= xiP
0(X)rjDS
@SeDj
@si
  si@x
eD
i
@si
(6-1)
  (1  i)xiP 0(X)rjDS
@SeDj
@si
  (1  i)xi + (1  j)xjP 0(X)riDS
@SeDi
@si
: (6-2)
Comparing the subsidy incentive in the above equation with the one without cross share-
holding in (5-19), I can show that the terms in (6-1) represent the subsidy incentives
under managerial delegation without cross shareholding as in Das (1997) and the terms in
(6-2) the subsidy incentives specic to cross-country shareholding. Further, (6-2) can be
decomposed into three parts.
The rst part (1 i)xiP 0(X)rjDS
@SeDj
@si
shows the cross rent-shifting eect through
managerial delegation . Export subsidy to the home rm, through the standard rent-
shifting eect, increases its prot, but it leads to an increase in the dividend given to
the foreign rm. Note that
rjDS @SeDj@si  < @xeDj@si , and hence, export subsidy increases the
1The SOC for welfare maximization is satised.
@2WEi (s;)
@s2i
=   4
25
(11  9i + 4j) < 0:
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domestic owner's subsidy and leads to ercer competition in the output market. The
domestic rm's prot gain shrinks and the dividend given to the foreign rm decreases.
The second part  (1  i)xi shows the subsidy outow eect , which has the same
expression as in the case without managerial delegation.
The third part (1   j)xjP 0(X)riDS @S
eD
i
@si
shows the dividend suppression eect
through managerial delegation . Further, note that riDS
@SeDi
@si
<
@xeDi
@si
, and hence, man-
agerial delegation scales down the decrease in the dividend from the shared foreign rm.
The above three negative parts weaken subsidy incentives in the presence of cross-
country shareholding.
Denote RiE(sj;) as country i's reaction function, where superscript E represents the
values under international separation of ownership and management.
An increase in the domestic residents' ownership share over the domestic rm (or the
foreign residents' ownership share over the foreign rm) strengthens both countries' subsidy
incentives, leading to an increase in the optimal export subsidy. The results follow from
RiEi (sj;) =
@RiE(sj;)
@i
=  @
2Wi(s;)=@i@si
@2Wi(s;)=@s2i
=   @
eD
i (s)=@si
@2Wi(s;)=@s2i
> 0;
RiEj (sj;) =
@RiE(sj;)
@j
=  @
2Wi(s;)=@j@si
@2Wi(s;)=@s2i
=
@eDj (s)=@si
@2Wi(s;)=@s2i
> 0;
where use was made of (5-16) and (5-17).
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6.3 Eects of Cross-Country Shareholding
6.3.1 Equilibrium Government Subsidy
Denote sEi () as the equilibrium government's subsidy of country i. The full-game Nash
equilibrium subsidy prole is thus dened as a solution to
sEi () = R
iE(sEj ();) (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i):
Under the symmetric cost conditions, that ci = cj = c,
sEi () =
(16i + 13j   10ij   18)(a  c)
2[24  11(i + j) + 5ij] : (6-3)
The optimal subsidy rate is dependent on the cross shareholding structure (i; j). From
Assumption 4.1, the denominator in (6-3) is positive, i.e., 24 11(i+j)+5ij > 0, and
hence sEi () is positive if and only if j >
18 16i
13 10i . Figure 6.1 illustrates (1; 2) for which
country 1's government nds zero subsidy optimal with origin (0:5; 0:5). In view of Figure
6.1, when the domestic shares of both rms are large enough, each country's government
subsidizes the rm; otherwise, export tax is the optimal policy.
Without cross-country shareholding, Das (1997) showed that sEi (1; 1) = s
D
i =
1
14
(a  
c) > 0 in (5-20), and each government always has a positive incentive to subsidize its
exports. In the presence of cross-country shareholding, (6-3) shows that
@sEi (i;j)
@k
> 0(k =
i; j), which yields
sEi (i; j) < s
E
i (1; 1):
Proposition 6.1. Given managerial delegation, the presence of cross-country shareholding
weakens both countries' subsidization incentives, i.e., sEi (i; j) < s
E
i (1; 1).
6.3.2 Equilibrium Owner's Subsidy Equivalent
In view of (5-10), the owner's subsidy equivalent is always positive in the duopolistic
market. Solving for the owner's subsidy equivalent in the equilibrium yields
dEi () = d
eD
i (s
E
i (); s
E
j ()) =
3(2  j)(a  c)
2[24  11(i + j) + 5ij] > 0: (6-4)
It is easy to show that
@dEi ()
@i
> 0. Increasing domestic ownership strengthens the
domestic owner's subsidy incentives.
Dierentiating (6-4) with j yields
@dEi ()
@j
=
 3(2  i)
2[24  11(i + j) + 5ij]2 (a  c) < 0:
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The above equation is equivalent to
@dEi ()
@(1 j) > 0. Increasing the shares of foreign equities
owned by domestic residents also increases the domestic owner's subsidy equivalent.
Comparing dEi (i; j) with d
E
i (1; 1) yields
2
dEi (i; j)  dEi (1; 1) =
3(2  j)(a  c)
2[24  11(i + j) + 5ij]  
3(a  c)
14
=   3[10  11i   4j + 5ij]
14[24  11(i + j) + 5ij] (a  c):
Thus, dEi (i; j) < d
E
i (1; 1) if only if i <
10 4j
11 5j , or equivalently, i = i   j <
5(1 j)(2 j)
11 5j . The owner's subsidy equivalent may be larger in the presence of cross-country
shareholding if the two rms' domestic share dierence is large enough.
6.3.3 Equilibrium Output
Under the linear demand function, the equilibrium output yields
xEi () = 2d
E
i () =
3(2  j)(a  c)
24  11(i + j) + 5ij :
The same result holds for the equilibrium output, i.e., xEi (i; j) < x
E
i (1; 1) if and only if
i <
10 4j
11 5j .
Proposition 6.2. Given managerial delegation, the presence of cross-country shareholding
may increase rm i's equilibrium output if rm i's domestic share i is large enough.
dEi (i; j) T dEi (1; 1) () xEi (i; j) T xEi (1; 1) () i T
10  4j
11  5j :
Note that if i <
16
17
, cross-country shareholding always lowers rm i's equilibrium
output, i.e., xEi (i; j) < x
E
i (1; 1) irrespective of values of j.
6.3.4 Equilibrium Total Subsidy
Solving for total subsidy, it yields
SEi () = s
E
i () + d
E
i () =
(8i + 5j   5ij   6)(a  c)
24  11(i + j) + 5ij :
SEi () is positive if and only if j >
2(3 4i)
5(1 i) . (1; 2) for S
E
1 () = 0 are depicted in Figure
6.1. Although the owner's subsidy equivalent is always positive, total subsidy may become
negative when foreign residents' ownership in the home rm's shares is large enough. That
is, the government's optimal tari outweighs the owner's optimal subsidy.
Since
@SEi ()
@k
> 0(k = i; j), SEi (i; j) < S
E
i (1; 1) always holds.
2dEi (1; 1) is equivalent to d^
D
i in (5-22).
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6.4 Eects of Managerial Delegation
Next, I examine the eects of managerial delegation under cross-country shareholding.
Without managerial delegation, the optimal government subsidy (see Dick (1993), Welzel
(1995)) yields
sCi () =
(16i + 12j   12ij   15)(a  c)
33  20(i + j) + 12ij :
sCi () > 0 is positive if and only if j >
15 16i
12(1 i) . (1; 2) for s
C
1 () = 0 are shown by
the dashed line in Figure 6.1, which lies between the lines for sE1 () = 0 and S
E
1 () = 0.
Figure 6.1 shows that without managerial delegation, the government is more likely to
subsidize its own rm.
(0.5,0.5)
2
1
1
1
0.8
7/11
2/3
5/6
SE1 > 0
SE1 > 0
SE1 < 0
sE1 < 0
sE1 < 0
sE1 > 00.9
0.6
SE1 = 0
sE1 = 0
sC1 = 0
3/4
0.9
(1,1)
1
Fig. 6.1: sE1 and S
E
1
Without managerial delegation, the equilibrium output yields
xCi () =
2(3  2j)(a  c)
33  20(i + j) + 12ij :
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6.4.1 Optimal Subsidy
Comparing sEi () with s
C
i () yields
sEi ()  sCi () =
(16i + 13j   10ij   18)(a  c)
2[24  11(i + j) + 5ij]  
(16i + 12j   12ij   15)(a  c)
33  20(i + j) + 12ij
=
4(1  7i)2j   (117  216i + 322i )j + 126  210i + 322i
2[24  11(i + j) + 5ij][33  20(i + j) + 12ij] (a  c):
(6-5)
Since the denominator in (6-5) is positive, the sign of sEi ()  sCi () is determined by the
numerator. Dene
f() = 4(1  7i)2j   (117  216i + 322i )j + 126  210i + 322i (6-6)
which is a quadric equation of j. The discriminant for f() is given by (i)
def
= (117 
216i+32
2
i )
2 16(1 7i)(126 210i+322i ). There are four solutions for (i) = 0, but
because of Assumption 4.1, I only consider the range around i 2 (0:5; 1). Since (0:5) > 0
and (1) < 0, there exist at least one solution satisfying (i) = 0 for all i 2 (0:5; 1) in
view of the intermediate-value theorem.
Lemma 6.1. For all i 2 (0:5; 1), there exists a unique i = b satisfying (b) = 0.
Proof. (Reduction to absurdity) If there are two solutions a; b (0:5 < a < b < 1)
satisfying (a) = (b) = 0, by the mean-value theorem, there must exist c 2 (a; b)
satisfying 0(c) = 0. Since 
00
(i) = 64(941   960i + 1922i ) > 0 for all i 2 (0:5; 1),
0(i) > 0 for all i > c. This leads to (i) > 0 for all i > b, which contradicts the
result that (1) < 0.
From above and Lemma 6.1, it yields
(i) T 0 () i S b ; 8i 2 (0:5; 1): (6-7)
Since 1  7i < 0 in (6-6), from the results in (6-7); sEi () vs. sCi () can be shown for
the following three cases.
(I)When i > b, (i) < 0 holds.
f() < 0 () sEi () < sCi ()
(II)When i < b, (i) > 0 holds. There exist two real roots j(i) and j(i)
satisfying f(i; j) = f(i; j) = 0.8<:
f() > 0 () sEi () > sCi () when j(i) < j < j(i)
f() = 0 () sEi () = sCi () when j = j(i) or j(i)
f() < 0 () sEi () < sCi () when j(i) < j or j > j(i);
where j(i) =
117 216i+322i+
p
(i)
8(1 7i) and j(i) =
117 216i+322i 
p
(i)
8(1 7i) .
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(III)When i = b, (i) = 0 holds and j(b) = j(b).
f() < 0 () sEi () < sCi () when j 6= j(b)
f() = 0 () sEi () = sCi () when j = j(b)
　
The values of the two roots, j(i) and j(i), for (i) = 0 yield the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2. For all i 2 (0:5; b), j(i) and j(i) satisfy:
(i) j
0(i) < 0 ; j 0(i) > 0.
(ii) j(i) T 1 () i S m.
(iii) j(i) T 0:5 () i T n.
Here 0:5 < m < n < b < 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The curves for 2(1) and 2(1) obtained from Lemma 6.2, are depicted in Figure 6.2.
The two curves intersected at 1 = b, where 2(b) = 2(b). Figure 6.2 is largely divided
into two areas by the curves of 2(1) and 2(1). The left area shows s
E
i () > s
C
i ()
and the right area shows the opposite one; the curves represent sEi () = s
C
i (). Note
that regardless the value of 2, if 1 > b, sE1 () < sC1 () always holds; and if i < m,
sE1 () > s
C
1 () always holds.
Proposition 6.3. Given cross-country shareholding, managerial delegation may raise or
lower the governments' optimal subsidy rates depending on the cross shareholding structure
(i; j) when m  i  b. Furthermore, if the domestic shareholding ratio is small enough
that i < m, managerial delegation always strengthens the government's subsidization
incentive; if the domestic shareholding ratio is large enough that i > b, the government's
subsidization incentive is always weakened under managerial delegation.
Without cross shareholding, as shown in the previous chapters, managerial delegation
always weakens the government's subsidization incentive. When the domestic shareholding
ratio is large, a small fraction of foreign shareholding does not change this result. However,
when the domestic shareholding is small enough, a nearly half, the large portion of foreign
shareholding induces the government to tax the exports. Under managerial delegation, the
negative cross-rent shifting and dividend suppression eects are dampened, and as such,
the government's tax incentive is also weakened.
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(0:5; 0:5)
2
1
1
1nm b
sE1 () < s
C
1 ()s
E
1 () > s
C
1 ()
2(1)
2(1)
2(b) = 2(b)
Fig. 6.2: Values of sE1 () vs. s
C
1 ()
6.4.2 Owner's Subsidy Equivalent and Total Subsidy
dEi () > s
C
i () and S
E
i () > s
C
i () hold for any given (i; j). With managerial delega-
tion, both the owner's subsidy equivalent and total subsidy always result in higher subsidy
rates regardless of the cross shareholding structure.
6.4.3 Output Decision
Comparing xEi () with x
C
i () yields
xEi ()  xCi () =
2(1  i)(27  29j + 82j ) + j
[24  11(i + j) + 5ij][33  20(i + j) + 12ij] > 0:
Given k(k = i; j) > 0:5, x
E
i () > x
C
i () holds. Managerial delegation increases the
equilibrium output irrespective of the cross shareholding structure.
Proposition 6.4. Given cross-country shareholding, managerial delegation always in-
creases each rm's equilibrium output, i.e., xEi () > x
C
i ().
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6.5 Equilibrium Results under Four Cases
In this section, I summarize the equilibrium results analyzing the implication of sharehold-
ing structure and managerial delegation on the governments' subsidy incentives under the
following four cases.
 Case B: without managerial delegation and cross shareholding,
 Case C: with only cross-country shareholding,
 Case D: with only managerial delegation,
 Case E: with both managerial delegation and cross-country shareholding.
The above four cases are discussed in the previous chapters and this chapter. The related
papers are shown in the following table.
Tab. 6.2: Related Papers
Cross-Country Shareholding No Shareholding
Delegation [Chap.6 ] Wei (2009b) [Chap.5 ] Wei (2008)
No Delegation [Chap.4 ] Wei and Kiyono (2005) [Chap.2 ] Brander and Spencer (1985)
6.5.1 Optimal Subsidy
First, the government's optimal subsidy rate under the four cases is summarized as below.
Tab. 6.3: Government's Optimal Subsidy Rate
si Cross-Country Shareholding No Shareholding
Delegation sEi () =
(16i+13j 10ij 18)
2[24 11(i+j)+5ij ] (a  c) sDi = 114(a  c)
No Delegation sCi () =
(16i+12j 12ij 15)
33 20(i+j)+12ij (a  c) sBi = 15(a  c)
As shown in Propositions 4.1 and 6.1, cross-country shareholding always lowers the
government's optimal subsidy rate irrespective of the managerial decision, i.e., sCi () < s
B
i
and sEi () < s
D
i .
As shown in Lemma 5.2, managerial delegation always lowers government's optimal sub-
sidy rate in the absence of cross shareholding, i.e., sDi < s
B
i . However, with cross-country
shareholding, the eects of managerial delegation on the optimal subsidy are dependent
on the cross shareholding structure (i; j) shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.
Furthermore,
sCi ()  sDi =
(244i + 188j   180ij   243)
14(33  20(i + j) + 12ij) (a  c);
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which shows that sCi () > s
D
i if and only if j >
243 244i
188 180i . (1; 2) satisfying s
C
i () = s
D
i
are depicted in Figure 6.3.
(0:5; 0:5)
2
1
1
1nm
0:7
b
2(1)
2(1)
(I)
(II)
2(b) = 2(b)
0:9
(III)
55
64
sCi () = s
D
i
sEi () = s
C
i ()
Fig. 6.3: Optimal Subsidy
Summarizing the above results, the ranking of equilibrium subsidy rate under the four
cases as shown in Figure 6.3 is as below.
 (i; j) 2 Region (I): sCi () < sEi () < sDi < sBi ,
 (i; j) 2 Region (II): sEi () < sCi () < sDi < sBi ,
 (i; j) 2 Region (III): sEi () < sDi < sCi () < sBi .
Note that the government's equilibrium subsidy rate is the highest under the BS model, the
case without managerial delegation and cross shareholding. The presence of both manage-
rial delegation and cross shareholding weakens the government's subsidization incentive.
The lower the domestic shareholding ratio, the stronger the eect of cross shareholding
and the weaker the eect of managerial delegation.
6.5.2 Output Decision
The following table summarizes the individual rm's equilibrium output under the four
cases.
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Tab. 6.4: Individual Firm's Equilibrium Output
xi Cross-Country Shareholding No Shareholding
Delegation xEi () =
3(2 j)
24 11(i+j)+5ij (a  c) xDi = 37(a  c)
No Delegation xCi () =
2(3 2j)
33 20(i+j)+12ij (a  c) xBi = 25(a  c)
From Proposition 6.4 and the results of the table, managerial delegation always in-
creases the rms' equilibrium outputs irrespective of the cross shareholding stricture, i.e.,
xDi > x
B
i and x
E
i () > x
C
i ().
Proposition 6.2 shows that cross-country shareholding may increase the rms' equilib-
rium outputs if the domestic share is large enough and there is separation of ownership
and management. That is, xEi () > x
D
i if and only if i >
10 4j
11 5j .
The ranking of the equilibrium output under the four cases is shown in Figure 6.4.
2
1
1
1(0:5; 0:5)
11
12
29
34
13
14
16
17
41
42
3
4
xDi > x
B
i > x
E
i > x
C
i
xDi > x
E
i > x
B
i > x
C
i
xDi > x
E
i > x
C
i > x
B
i
xEi > x
D
i > x
C
i > x
B
i
xEi > x
C
i > x
D
i > x
B
i
Fig. 6.4: Equilibrium Output
Note that the equilibrium output is the highest under the case with only managerial
delegation. The presence of cross shareholding increases (reduces) the equilibrium output
when the domestic shareholding ratio is high (low). The lower the domestic shareholding
ratio, the stronger the negative eect of cross shareholding on reducing the equilibrium
output.
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6.6 Special Shareholding Structures
In this section, I examine the equilibrium subsidy rates under two special shareholding
structures.
6.6.1 Symmetric Shareholding Structure when i = j = 
In view of Figure 6.1, sEi (; ) > 0 if  > 0:9 and S
E
i (; ) > 0 if  > 0:6.
Comparing sEi (; ) with s
C
i (; ) yields
sEi (; )  sCi (; ) =
3(7  10)(a  c)
264  254 + 602 :
Thus, sEi (; ) T sCi (; ) if  S 0:7. The ranking of equilibrium subsidy rates are shown
as below.
  2 [0; 5; 0:7] : sCi (; )  sEi (; ) < sDi < sBi
  2 (0:7; 0:9] : sEi (; ) < sCi (; )  sDi < sBi
  2 (0:9; 1] : sEi (; ) < sDi < sCi (; )  sBi
which are shown in Figure 6.3.
6.6.2 Partial Shareholding Structure when i = 1
When rm i's shares are totally owned by its own country's residents as i = 1, s
E
i (1; j) >
0 if j >
2
3
and sEj (1; j) > 0 if j >
5
6
shown in Figure 6.1. Total subsidies of both rms
(SEi ; S
E
j ) are always positive.
In view of Figure 6.3, when i = 1, s
E
i (1; j) < s
D
i < s
C
i (1; j) < s
B
i holds regardless of
the value of j.
However, comparing sEj (1; j) with s
C
j (1; j) yields
sEj (1; j)  sCj (1; j) =
13  22j
338  364j + 962j
(a  c):
Since the denominator is always positive, sEj (1; j) < s
C
i (1; j) if and only if j > m.
 j 2 [0:5; m] : sCj (1; j)  sEj (1; j) < sDj < sBj
 j 2 (m; 5564 ] : sEj (1; j) < sCj (1; j)  sDj < sBj
 j 2 (5564 ; 1] : sEj (1; j) < sDi < sCi (1; j)  sBi
which are shown in Figure 6.3.
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6.7 Thesis Conclusion
This thesis examines the traditional strategic trade policies in the presence of capital lib-
eralization, international cross shareholding and separation of ownership and management
in an international duopolistic market. Although the analyses are limited in the frame-
work of the BS model, the essential results are not changed when considering domestic
consumer surplus. In Chapter 3, unilateral capital liberalization may lower the domestic
country's subsidy rate, but it raises the rival country's subsidy rate. However, bilateral
capital liberalization dampens both countries' subsidization incentives and leads to free
trade. Strategic subsidization strongly reacts to capital liberalization policy in a negative
way, since rm relocation ability directly aects the subsidy expenses. In Chapter 4, un-
der international cross shareholding when a part of equities of both rms are owned by
the foreign country's residents or the rival rm's shareholders, government subsidization
is weakened, but not disappears. Both governments still have positive incentives to subsi-
dize their exports, since cross shareholding only causes a part of domestic prot in change
of foreign prot and the governments need not subsidize the foreign products. Strategic
subsidization reacts negatively, but not so strongly to cross shareholding. In Chapter 5,
under managerial delegation, the owners have positive incentives to subsidize their prod-
ucts. When governments involve in, government subsidization is weakened, but it actually
raises the owner's subsidy incentives and leads to higher total subsidy. Thus, strategic
subsidization reacts positively to managerial delegation.
Chapter 6 combines the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 and examines the implication of
the cross shareholding structure and managerial decision of rms on the strategic export
subsidy incentives. Although the presence of either cross shareholding or managerial dele-
gation weakens the exporting countries' subsidization incentives, their combined presence
does not. It is found that the cross shareholding structure always weakens both countries'
subsidization incentives irrespective of the managerial delegation. However, managerial
delegation may raise or lower the optimal subsidy (or tax) rate depending on the cross
shareholding structure.
Chapters 4 to 6 focus on the separation of the rm's structure: separation of ownership
and management and separation of stocks among dierent nationals. The separation of
ownership and management makes the rms behave more aggressively, and the separation
of stocks among the rival rm's shareholders makes them collude with each other. As for
the government's subsidy policy decision, both separation eects weaken the government's
subsidization incentives. The strength of the two separation eects is dependent on the
cross shareholding structure. The lower the domestic shareholding ratio, the larger the
eect of cross shareholding.
Besides separation, merger is also often found in modern enterprises. In contrast to the
analyses in Chpaters 4 to 6, it is interesting to examine integration in the rm' structure:
integration of management and integration of stocks (merger). The study to examine the
integration eect on the rms' behavior and government's policy decision complements the
research in this thesis and gives some new implications on the analyses of trade policy
dealing with the rm's structure.
112
This thesis provids new insights into the traditional strategic export subsidy stud-
ies. The ow of foreign direct investment and the diversied ownership and management
structure of the rm make the subsidy policy analysis more complicated and they give the
standard rent shifting eect a whole new meaning. The studies in this thesis can be applied
into R&D subsidy competition, environment regulation policies and public rm analysis.
Furthermore, the thesis examines the welfare eects of export subsidy policy and discusses
what kind of coordination policies is necessary from the viewpoint of world welfare maxi-
mization. The study is expected as a cornerstone research toward institution-building for
international harmonization.
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Appendix
6.A Proof in Lemma 6.2
(i) Dierentiating j() and j() with i yields
j
0(i) =
A(i) +B(i)
8
p
(i)(1  7i)2
; j
0(i) =
A(i) B(i)
8
p
(i)(1  7i)2
where A(i) := (603 + 64i   2242i )
p
(i) and B(i) :=
1
2
(1   7i)0(i) + 7(i).
Given Assumption 4.1, A(i) > 0 and B(i) > 0 since (i) > 0 and 
0(i) < 0 for all
i 2 (0:5; b). Thus, it is evident that j 0(i) > 0.
The sign for j
0(i) is dependent on the dierence between A(i) and B(i). Since
A(i) +B(i) > 0, the dierence of their squares is shown as below.
A(i)
2  B(i)2
=  32(1  7i)2(105399 + 261024i   2212482i   1157123i + 788484i )
=  32(1  7i)2[105399(1  3i ) + 2212482i (1  i) + 103132i (1  i) + 294642i + 788484i ]
< 0
Thus, A(i) < B(i), which yields j
0(i) < 0.
(ii) Comparing j(i) with 1 yields
j(i)  1 = 109  160i + 32
2
i  
p
(i)
8(1  7i) ;
where the sign is determined by the numerator. Dene fm : 109   160m + 322m  p
(m) = 0g. Under constraint in Assumption 4.1, one solution is obtained: m = 1322 .
Simple computation shows (m) > 0, then m < b holds. In view of j 0(i) < 0,
j(i) S 1 if and only if i T 1322 for all i 2 (0:5; b).
j(i) T 1 () i S m = 13
22
; 8 i 2 (0:5; b)
114
(iii) Comparing j(i) with 0:5 yields
j(i)  0:5 = 113  188i + 32
2
i +
p
(i)
8(1  7i)
where the sign is determined by the numerator. Dene fn : 113   188n + 322n  p
(n) = 0g. One solution is n = 109 21
p
17
32
under the constraint in Assumption 4.1.
Simple computation shows (n) > 0, then n < m < b holds. In view of j 0(i) > 0,
j(i) T 0:5 if and only if i T 109 21
p
17
32
for all i 2 (0:5; b).
j(i) T 0:5 () i T n = 109  21
p
17
32
; 8 i 2 (0:5; b)
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